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The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) was established
to plan and execute the safe destruction of the nation's stockpile of unitary chemical
weapons. The CSDP is unique in that it is not a weapon system production program
but, a weapon system destruction program with a mandated completion date of
December 31, 2004. Execution of the program requires that multiple public issues
be addressed including the public's concern regarding safety and the environment.
Cost growth and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) permit delays have
jeopardized on time completion within life cycle cost estimates. Another relevant
issue is reform of the acquisition process, specifically the DoD requirement to convert
military-unique specifications and standards to performance statements or
commercial equivalents. This research provides evidence that acquisition reform
initiatives on specifications and standards has had a positive influence on program
costs with no overall program schedule delays. Continued efforts in this area should
enhance the ability to demilitarize the nation's deteriorating stockpile of lethal
chemical weapons within projected cost while maintaining or improving the quality
and safety levels currently set by the EPA. The specific recommendations provided
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Concern for man himself and his fate must always form the chief interest of
all technical endeavor. Never forget this in the midst ofyour diagrams and
equations.
Albert Einstein
Since World War I the United States has maintained a stockpile of chemical weapons
and agents as a deterrent against enemy use of biological warfare on our troops. Beginning
in the 1950s the Army began the disposal ofthese weapons as the need for such weapons had
significantly decreased. Disposal in the 1950s and 1960s consisted of ocean burial and open
pit burning. During the 1970s these methods of disposal were halted as awareness of damage
to the environment heightened and concerns for human health and safety due to pollution of
the water, air, and earth became apparent.
An executive order was signed by President Nixon in 1969 that directed termination
ofthe production of all unitary chemical weapons. The chemical stockpile, accumulated prior
to the termination ofthe production program, consists of artillery projectiles, mortars, mines,
rockets, bombs, and bulk containers ofnerve and blister agents. These weapons are stored
at eight sites within the contiguous United States and one she in the Pacific. The aging ofthat
stockpile is causing increased risks to the safety and health of military personnel assigned to
these sites and civilian communities adjacent to the storage areas due to the deterioration of
the munitions and their containers. (Livingstone, 1992)
The U. S. Army's Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) was established to
plan and execute the safe destruction of the nation's stockpile of unitary chemical weapons.
The execution ofthis program requires that multiple public concerns be addressed. The most
recent of those concerns involves the reform of the acquisition process, specifically the
requirement to convert to the usage ofnongovernmental specifications and standards.
This chapter defines the scope and objective ofthis thesis, describes the methodology
used to perform the research, and provides an outline ofthe thesis
A. THESIS SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE
The scope ofthis research is limited to an analysis ofthe contracting efforts in support
ofthe CSDP—specifically, it addresses how the contracting effort is affected by the acquisition
reform initiative to convert military specifications and standards to performance
specifications or commercial standards. This analysis entailed identifying the agencies involved
in the specification and standard conversion process for the CSDP and accessing the
magnitude of the conversion effort. Future reference to specification and/or standard
conversion is intended to include the efforts being expended for both types of changes, i.e.,
to commercial specifications or standards and to performance specifications. In conjunction
with the primary research, critical issues with the potential to raise congressional or public
concern and possibly impact the CSDP were also addressed.
The research objective is to identify the issues that impact the contracting efforts in
support ofthe CSDP during the specification conversion. A specific area of concern is the
affect on cost and schedule. Additionally, analysis ofthe data collected provides insight into
the issues that generate public interest. Public concern causes congressional reaction that can
impact the ability of the program manager to execute the program Program delay causes
delays in solicitation and contracting actions required to implement this public mandate. The
issues of risk and safety are auxiliary items that must be considered when assessing impacts
associated with specification changes. These areas will be considered in an effort to reach
an informed conclusion and to make recommendations that may mitigate their impact on the
CSDP. A secondary objective is to provide recommendations on the specification revision
process, and procedures that may be of future benefit to other programs involved in
acquisition reform efforts to convert to commercial and performance based specifications and
standards.
B. METHODOLOGY
This thesis utilizes an historical and analytical perspective to identify the range and
breadth of interests in the CSDP and the impact that actions to convert to commercial and
performance specifications may have on that program Literature searches were made using
the resources available at the Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library, the Defense
Technical Information Center (DTIC), and the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange (DLSIE). These searches provided background and historical information
regarding the CSDP and acquisition reform initiatives. Congressional Hearings, General
Accounting Office Reports, legislation, Inspector General Reports, and audits from the
Defense and Army Audit Agencies were included in the reviews as well as articles from
periodicals and publications addressing the chemical stockpile, specification preparation,
acquisition reform, and contracting procedures.
Telephonic information searches were conducted to identify the Army and Defense
offices involved in the CSDP and the specification acquisition reform initiative. Points of
contact were established at the following offices:
• U.S. Army Chemical Destruction and Remediation Agency (USACDRA):
Program Manager (PM).
• U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command (IOC): Procuring Contracting
Officer (PCO).
• U.S. Corps ofEngineers (COE): Adrninistrative Contracting Officer (ACO)
and agency designated to prepare construction specifications.
• U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC): Procurement Policy Oversight
Authority for IOC.
• Assistant Secretary ofthe Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition
(ASARDA): Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).
• Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform:
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Chair.
Questions were prepared for interviews with personnel involved in the planning and
execution of the CSDP and the conversion of military specifications and standards to
performance specifications. The interview questions shown in Exhibit B support the primary
and subsidiary research questions set forth below.
Primary - What impact will the acquisition reform requirement to use
performance specifications have on the CSDP contracting efforts?
Subsidiary:
1. What is the nature and extent of the CSDP and what are the critical issues
associated with it?
2. What are the activities necessary to convert current specifications to
predominantly performance specifications?
3. What is the affect on schedules and cost to accomplish this conversion
process?
4. What are the potential effects ofthe conversion process on EPA approvals and
certification requirements?
5. To what extent will contract type for the CSDP be affected by predominant
use ofperformance specifications? What measurement techniques could be used to evaluate
contractor performance?
During the interviews it became apparent that the effort of conversion to commercial
specifications and standards was not distinguishable from the endeavors to move to
performance specifications and standards. The questions were appropriately amended at the
time ofthe interviews to include commercial specifications and standards. Much of subsidiary
question one was answered during the literature search and the telephonic search for agency
points of contact. Additional information was provided during interviews with personnel
from the Program Manager's (PM) office and the PCO. Responses were received from the
PM's office, PCO, ACO, AMC and ASARDA in support of subsidiary questions two and
three. The PM was the critical source ofinformation for analysis of subsidiary question four.
Subsidiary question five was primarily addressed by personnel in the contracting offices.
C. THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter I. Introduction. This chapter defines the scope and objective of this
research, describes the methodology used to perform the research, and provides an outline
of this thesis.
Chapter n. Chemical Stockpile Background. Chapter II provides insight into
the nature of and the critical issues associated with the CSDP. The statutory requirements
ofthe program are set forth and discussed. The environmental considerations that must be
addressed during the program execution are summarized. Finally, discussion ofthe approved
acquisition strategy and how the congressional and public interests molded that strategy is
presented.
Chapter IQ. Acquisition Reform Initiative. In this chapter the acquisition reform
initiative requiring conversion to commercial specifications or standards and performance
based specifications is examined. The Department ofDefense (DoD) policy on specifications
and standards is set forth and the Army's implementation plans and initiatives in this area of
acquisition reform is detailed.
Chapter IV. Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Specification Reform This
chapter describes the actions taken to comply with the DoD direction to convert to
performance specifications. The resource expenditures and schedule impacts reported by the
conversion activities as necessary to accomplish the specification conversions are summarized.
The actual or anticipated affects that the conversion process may have on EPA approvals or
certification requirements are discussed. This chapter also examines the measurement
techniques that the contracting office anticipates using to evaluate contractor performance
and the potential affect that conversion to performance specifications may have on the type
of contract used for the program
Chapter V. Analysis. Chapter V sets forth an analysis of the data collected
and discussed in Chapter rV. It contains an analysis ofthe process and procedures being used
to accomplish the conversion process. Cost and schedule impacts that have been incurred or
that are anticipated in conjunction with the CSDP are assessed and scrutinized for efficiencies
or potential inefficiencies. An evaluation offorecast affects on EPA approval and certification
requirements is made based on the assessment of data received. Techniques anticipated for
use to measure contractor performance using the converted specifications is compared to
measurement techniques used in previous contracts. Finally, the contract type planned for the
CSDP after implementation ofperformance specifications is discussed.
Chapter VI. Conclusions and Recommendations. This chapter summarizes the
research findings and conclusions resulting from the analysis, and makes recommendations
aimed at improving the specification conversion process.
D. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
Definitions and acronyms common to DoD, the U.S. Army, and civilian agencies of
the Government are used throughout this thesis. A listing of definitions and acronyms is
provided at Appendix A.
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n. CHEMICAL STOCKPILE PROGRAM BACKGROUND
A. CSDP BACKGROUND
Germany first used poison gas in World War I on April 22, 1915, during the Second
Battle ofYpres. In response to the threat posed by Germany during World War I, the United
States began the development ofchemical weapons. (Heller, 1984) With the changing threat,
Russia and the Warsaw Pact countries developed and amassed about 40,000 tons of chemical
weapons as an offensive weapon. In turn, the United States produced its own arsenal of
chemical weapons and chemical defense tactics and equipment. The bulk ofthis 25,000 to
30,000 ton stockpile of unitary chemical weapons is now at least 25 years old, with some
munitions as old as 45 years. (Foote, 1994)
Unitary chemical weapons contain agents that, by virtue of their molecular
composition and structure, are highly toxic and lethal in themselves. Binary chemical
munitions were designed to avoid the dangers of storing lethal chemical agents in that they
were loaded with two relatively safe chemicals in separate compartments within a single
projectile. The munition becomes lethal only when the two chemicals are mixed together.
Accordingly, the components of binary munitions are stockpiled apart, in separate states.
(NRC, 1994) This paper addresses the unitary weapon stockpile only.
During the 1950s and 1960s chemical weapons were destroyed by ocean burial and
open pit burning. An environmentally safe procedure for destruction ofthe military's unitary
weapon stockpile was sought during the late 1960s as ocean dumping and open pit burning
were no longer viable due to environmental and health considerations. In 1969 a then state-
of-the-art incineration facility was constructed at Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) in
Colorado. There was opposition to the incineration operation at RMA from several citizen
groups, states, and environmental organizations. Concerns were raised by these groups
pertaining to adverse health effects as dioxins and furons present in some emissions had been
linked to cancer and other long-term health problems. As a result of the opposition,
operations at RMA were discontinued in 1976. (GAO, 1994)
The Army pursued studies with academia, industry and other agencies to determine
if alternate technologies existed that would be suitable for destroying the chemical weapons.
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) recommended construction of large industrial type
disposal plants that would be capable of destroying chemical munitions without being
hazardous to the public health or environment. Based on these recommendations and the
lesson-learned from the RMA disposal operations, the Army constructed and in 1979 began
operation of a pilot Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) facility at Tooele
Army Depot (TEAD) in Utah. The purpose of this facility was to test a prototype high
temperature incineration process and to explore other alternatives and improvements to the
demilitarization process. (HR, 1985)
In 1981 as a result ofthe testing at the CAMDS facility, the Army chose direct high
temperature incineration as the best and safest method for destroying chemical weapons and
agents. That same year the DoD named the Army the Defense Single Item Manager for all
ammunition, to include chemical weapons. At that time the Army established a Program
Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PMCD) and began development of disposal
alternatives. (Livingston, 1992)
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The Department ofDefense Authorization Act for 1986 [Public Law (PL) 99-145,
Section 1412] mandated disposal of the United States stockpile of unitary lethal chemical
agents and chemical agent munitions by September 30, 1994 (AMCCOM, 1992). Subsequent
legislation extended the deadline to December 31, 2004. The PMCD had developed four
alternatives for chemical weapon disposal by the time Congress enacted PL 99- 145. The first
alternative was to construct a national disposal center at TEAD. This would require 5
1
percent ofthe stockpiled chemical weapons to be transported through 20 states. The second
alternative was to establish two regional disposal centers. One center would be located in the
west at TEAD. The other facility would be in the east at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) in
Alabama. This option would require transport of 21.5 percent ofthe stockpile through five
western states, and 22.4 percent through midwestern and eastern states. Onsite disposal was
the third alternative. This alternative would establish disposal facilities at each ofthe eight
continental United States (CONUS) unitary chemical weapon storage sites. Option three
would not require off-post transportation ofthe chemical weapons. Figure 1 shows the sites
where unitary chemical weapons are stored. The eight CONUS and one outside CONUS
sites are:
Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Edgewood, Maryland.
Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), Anniston, Alabama.
Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD), Richmond, Kentucky.
Newport Army Ammunition Plant (NAAP), Newport, Indiana.
Pine BluffArsenal (PBA), Pine BlufI Arkansas.
Pueblo Depot Activity (PUDA), Pueblo, Colorado.
Tooele Army Depot (TEAD), Tooele, Utah.
Umatilla Depot Activity (UMDA), Hermiston, Oregon.







Figure 1. Location of Unitary Chemical Weapons Storage Facilities
Alternate four was to continue storage and maintaining the stockpile in place. After
PL 99-145 was enacted, alternate four was no longer an option. Due to the risks involved
in the transportation of these toxic chemicals through highly populated areas, the third
alternate was selected. (HR, 1986) Figure 2 indicates the percentage ofthe stockpile at each
CONUS location as reported in 1993 by the National Research Council. The chemical



















Figure 2. Stockpile Distribution by Percentage of Agent Tonnage
GB (Sarin and VX)), and blister agents (H. HD, HT (Mustard), and L (Lewisite)). Nerve
agents are the most lethal ofthe chemical agents. These agents inhibit the body's nervous
system from normal operation, including the nerves that control the diaphragm In cases of
lethal exposure, death is caused by asphyxiation. Mustard agents burn the eyes and lungs and
blisters the skin. (NRC, 1993)
Table 1 reflects the composition of the unitary stockpile by storage activity. The
stockpile is stored in a variety of containers: one-ton bulk containers, spray tanks, artillery
projectiles, mines, mortar rounds, and rockets. Many ofthe munitions also contain propellant
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and explosive components. (NRC, 1993) Those activities marked with an asterisk have M55
rockets with deteriorating containers which escalates storage dangers. (GAO, 1994)
In late 1985, the U.S. Army began construction ofthe world's first fully integrated
chemical munitions destruction facility on Johnston Atoll for destroying the weapons stored
Location Type Munition Amount
TEAD, Utah* Blister Agents H, HD, & HT




PBA, Arkansas* Blister Agents HD & HT
Nerve Agents GB & VX
Mines, Rockets, Ton Containers
3,850 tons
180,216 pieces
UMDA, Oregon* Blister Agent HD








ANAD, Alabama* Blister Agents HD & HT
Nerve Agents GB & VX




APG, Maryland Blister Agent HD— 1,818 Ton Containers 1,625 tons




Nerve Agents GB & VX





(As of Jan 96™
Active Demil)
Blister Agent HD




Table 1. Chemical Stockpile Composition by Site (Ruane, 1996)
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or transferred to that site in the Pacific. The design of the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent
Disposal System (JACADS) was based on the lessons learned at the TEAD CAMDS disposal
facility and is the prototype facility for the eight plants to be constructed in CONUS. The
construction, systemization, operation, and maintenance of the Johnston Atoll facility has
been closely monitored by the PMCD for the purpose of developing the specifications and
standards to be used for the CONUS faculties. The JACADS lessons learned provided
significant data on each type of weapon to be destroyed. The EPA monitored the
performance at JACADS closely to verify emission levels and identify problems that may
occur during the operational phase ofthe CONUS facilities.
In addition to the legislation directing destruction of stockpiled unitary chemical
weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) further supports United States policy
and resolve in this area. The proliferation of chemical weapons to what is believed to be
several dozen countries has increased interest in the execution ofthe CWC. (Smithson, 1995)
The United States played a decisive role in negotiating the treaty. As early as 1984, then Vice
President Bush offered the draft CWC text. (Smithson, 1995) In September 1989, the
United States and the Soviet Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a
bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical
weapons. In June of 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement on
Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and issued a joint statement on
nonproliferation. The leadership and demonstrated resolve of the United States to destroy
its stockpile of chemical weapons encouraged the international community to take action.
Secretary of State Eagleburger signed the CWC for the United States in January 1993. The
15
CWC requires that all signatory nations completely destroy all chemical weapons and all
chemical weapon production facilities within ten years after the CWC enters into force. The
CWC is expected to go before the United States Senate for ratification in 1996. (Smithson,
1996)
B. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
The PMCD and the contracting activity must comply with a variety of statutory and
regulatory requirements in the execution of this high profile program The nature of the
CSDP has caused congressional level interest as early as the 1960s due to the public interest
issues of the environment, health, and safety. As a result the Army has had congressional
assistance and direction for each major program decision. In addition to the programmatic
direction included in various appropriation acts, the PMCD must comply with procurement
statutes and regulations and environmental legislation at the Federal and state levels. This
section will discuss the environmental regulations that apply to the program, the legislative
and regulatory requirements that have influenced the CSDP acquisition strategy, the planned
contracting strategy, and the acquisition reform initiatives that may have a potential impact
on the program
1. Environmental Considerations
Secretary ofDefense Dick Cheney emphasized President Bush's desire for the United
States to be the world leader in addressing environmental problems and established the DoD
environmental management policy by memorandum dated October 10, 1989. The
memorandum is at Appendix C. In the memorandum Secretary Cheney states:
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We need to work harder at telling our environmental success stories and
solving our problems in an open, cooperative way with the public and also
appropriate regulatory authorities. The universal recognition of effective DoD
environmental compliance and stewardship activities is the surest way to
maintain our access to the air, land, and water we need to maintain and
improve our mission capability.
The statement ofwork and the contracting efforts for CSDP must be carried out with
utmost care to ensure that the required Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pollution
control standards are met and that public health is safeguarded. The EPA was created in
1970 as a result of the increasing awareness of damage to the environment. The EPA is
tasked with ensuring compliance with over 56 environmental laws at the Federal level. Table
2 sets forth the major pieces of environmental legislation with which the PMCD and the
contracting agency must be in compliance. The most significant enactments are discussed
below.
a. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
NEPA was enacted as PL 91-190 on January 1, 1970, to promote efforts that
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment. It directs all Federal agencies to
consider environmental values in decision making and requires preparation ofEnvironmental
Impact Statements (EIS) that must become a matter of public action and record prior to the
agency taking any action. An EIS must be conducted prior to commencing the construction
offacilities or the changing ofbasic operations at an installation or activity that may affect the
environment. (Kubiak, 1994) This means that a site specific EIS must be prepared for each
ofthe sites where chemical weapon destruction facilities are planned for construction. It also
means that should there be any alterations in the destruction methods that would change how
17
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
TITLE Yr. Major Provision(s)
National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)
1970 Requires Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for new facilities and EIS
amendments for changes in operation of
existing facilities
Clean Air Act (CCA) 1970 Prevention, control, and reduction or air
pollution emissions by major contributors
such as military installations




1976 Cradle-to-grave tracking and record
keeping ofhazardous materials, including
disposal of demilitarization waste by
products
Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)
1976 Authorizes EPA to regulate toxic chemical




1980 Created the Superfund for hazardous
substance cleanup programs and makes
Federal agencies financially liable for
cleanup
Energy Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
1986 To provide information to the general
public about chemicals to which they may
be exposed and develop plans of action in
the event of accidental release
Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA)
1990 Establishes Federally mandated minimum
standards and assigns states the
responsibility to assure air quality
Federal Facilities Compliance Act
(FFCA)
1992 Waives the sovereign immunity of Federal
facilities under RCRA
Table 2. Environmental Legislation Impacting the CSDP (O'Leary, 1993)
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the facility operates, an amendment must be prepared and submitted. The EIS is a time
consuming process that may take over a year to prepare and over two years for the EPA to
review. (GAO, 1990)
b. Clean Air Act (CAA) and Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA)
The CCA requires the EPA to establish National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for each air pollutant that is reasonably expected to endanger public
health or welfare. The NAAQS are enforceable limits established for six criteria pollutants
(ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, inhalable particulate matter, and
lead). New source reviews by the EPA imposes permit requirements for new major sources
of air pollution such as the demilitarization facilities. (Williamson, 1992) The CAAA imposes
more stringent requirements, including the attainment program and the operating permit
program Under the CAAA, areas where air quality is acceptable for a specific criterion
pollutant are designated as in attainment. Areas that do not meet the NAAQS are known as
nonattainment areas and fell under stricter regulation. Two stockpile sites, APG and BGAD,
are located in nonattainment areas for a criterion pollutant (ozone). (Foote, 1994)
Army demilitarization fecihties are required to comply with all Federal, state,
and local air pollution requirements to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity. A
demilitarization facility is an emission source for the following criteria pollutants: (1) sulfur
dioxide, (2) carbon monoxide, (3) nitrogen oxides, and (4) particulate matter. If a
demilitarization facility is to be built on an installation that is already a major stationary source
of air pollution, then the Army must evaluate the potential emissions from the proposed
facility to determine if its operation will result in a significant increase at the installation. If
19
it does, then the plant is a major modification which requires either a Prevention of Serious
Deterioration (PSD) permit or a nonattainment area permit. (USAEHA, 1992) The PSD
permit is required when an installation is in an area where the air quality standards prescribed
by the EPA are being met and the installation is proposing to build a facility that will
contribute to pollution but should not cause serious deterioration to air quality. All the
proposed demilitarization sites are located in areas that allow for moderate, well-controlled
industrial growth and will require PSD permits. (Foote, 1994) Processing any form of
environmental permit is not an expeditious process. Subchapter V ofthe CAA requires the
air permit authorities to either issue or deny a permit within eighteen months. However,
regulators have the discretion to determine when an application is complete and, ifthey are
so inclined, can find some defect that renders a permit incomplete, thus delaying permit
issuance and impacting planned operations. (Foote, 1994)
c. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
The RCRA established the first comprehensive national strategy for the
management of ongoing solid and hazardous waste operations. This Act provides for a
cradle-to-grave tracking system ofhazardous materials and includes record keeping on the
generation, transportation, storage, and disposal of these materials. RCRA is the primary
compliance document regarding hazardous waste management and policy. (Kubiak, 1994)
The CSDP must comply with this Act as its guidelines consider liquids, sludge, or
contaminated gasses as solid wastes. Additionally, the Federal Faculties Compliance Act
(FFCA) waives the sovereign immumty ofFederal facilities. However, the FFCA provides
authorization for Federal agencies to pay for inspections and monitoring activities by state
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regulators which had been previously delayed due to lack of staff and resources to process
and issue permits and their modifications for the demilitarization facilities. (Foote, 1994)
As treatment facilities for hazardous waste, the Army's demilitarization
incinerators must achieve a destruction and removal efficiency (DRE) rate of at least 99.99
percent for the principal organic hazardous constituents, except for the liquid incinerators,
which must achieve a DRE rate of 99.9999 percent. A DRE of 99.99 percent means that
9,999 molecules of a compound are destroyed for every 10,000 molecules that enter the
incinerator. Each facility has four incinerators as follows: Liquid Incinerator, Metal Parts
Furnace, Deactivation Facility, and Dunnage Incinerator. The DRE rates will be included in
the permits issued for each ofthe facilities based on the state and the EPA assessment ofthe
results ofthe trial burns during the systemization phase of facility operations. Each facility
must perform treatment operations within the ranges specified in the permit received for that
facility. (USACMDA, 1993)
d. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)
The TSCA authorizes the EPA to regulate new and existing chemical
substances and mixtures. The EPA is authorized to collect information on and regulate
production, processing, storage, distribution, use, and disposal oftoxic chemical. It requires
testing of chemicals entering the environment and regulates their release. (Murdock, 1994)
Trial bum data are required to obtain the permit required under TSCA to operate the Army's
planned demilitarization facilities. (Foote, 1994)
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e. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA)
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 and created the Superfund for the hazardous
substance cleanup program. This Act makes waste generators and operators liable for
response costs and for damage to the environment. An amendment to the Act in 1986
strengthened the EPA's existing authority to effect cleanup actions by making Federal
agencies financially liable for cleanup and damage costs. (Murdock, 1994) The question to
be resolved for the CSDP is whether it is possible to provide indemnification for CERCLA
liability. Open-ended indemnification provisions are prohibited in Government contracts
because they violate the Anti-Deficiency Act. The Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits the creation
ofan obligation ofFederal funds prior to congressional appropriation for the purpose ofthe
obligation. In considering a contractor's request for indemnification, the Government must
protect the public interest by ensuring that contractors are held accountable for environmental
compliance, while effecting an equitable distribution ofthe potential liability. (Foote, 1994)
f. Energy Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
The EPCRA was designed to support state and local emergency planning
efforts and information concerning potential hazards in their communities. Manufacturers are
required to report to the state and EPA the amounts of over 300 toxic chemicals that they
release into the environment or transfer to waste treatment or disposal facilities. The Act
extends to current Government-Owned/Contractor-Operated (GOCO) facilities as well as
those planned for the CSDP. GOCO facilities are required to develop plans for evacuation
and medical treatment in the event of a chemical release. (Shulman, 1992) Mock exercises
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of the plans developed in compliance with this Act are currently being executed at storage
sites.
g. State Laws Affecting the Demilitarization Program
States where demilitarization operations are to be conducted are enacting laws
which seek to regulate operations in their particular state. While states may regulate
demilitarization facilities, the Supremacy Clause ofthe United States Constitution (Article VI,
Clause 2), preempts a state from passing laws that operate to unreasonably restrict the
operation and purpose of Federal law. Otherwise, the states would be free to engage in a
never ending spiral of increasing regulatory requirements, designed to send the stockpile to
another "more deserving state" for treatment. The effect would be to sink the CSDP in a
morass of state statutory and regulatory requirements, thus defeating the will of Congress.
(Foote, 1994)
2. Legislative Background
The acquisition strategy for the CSDP has been shaped by legislation since 1986 and
prior to that by public policy. As the background ofthe program indicates, the Army had
been responsible for the management and disposal of obsolete chemical weapons since the
1950s. Due to growing environmental concerns and international issues regarding the storage
and destruction ofchemical agents, substantial pressure was brought to bear on the Army to
proceed expediousry but cautiously with this program This section will discuss the legislation
that has shaped the program and the strategy developed to execute the CSDP acquisitions.
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a. Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986
The genesis of the CSDP was the DoD Authorization Act of 1986. It
mandated the destruction ofthe stockpile ofunitary chemical weapons, provided a separate
DoD account to fund all activities, and required the Secretary of Defense to establish a
management organization in the Department ofthe Army to carry out the mission. The Act
required that a general officer be designated to direct the management organization. The Act
prohibited future use ofthe demilitarization facilities once the destruction ofthe stockpile was
complete. This was intended to assure communities living near the stockpile sites that the
facilities would not be used as hazardous waste disposal sites after stockpile destruction.
(Foote, 1994)
Prior to the 1986 Authorization Act, the Army had built the CAMDS facility
at TEAD to test a prototype high temperature incinerator process and to explore
improvements to the neutralization process. The result of that research effort was the
selection of the baseline technology (high temperature incineration) as the best and safest
method for destroying chemical weapons. In 1984, the National Research Council (NRC) of
the NAS endorsed incineration as the safest and preferred method for the stockpile
destruction. Following the CAMDS tests, the Army requested $46 minion to fund the
construction ofthe first disposal facility at Johnston Atoll. The Congress funded that request
in 1985. The Army obtained the environmental documentation and designed the Johnston
Atoll facility to have the capability to destroy all munition types stored at that site. When the
1986 Act was passed, the Army only requested funds for the additional equipment, no
redesign was necessary. (Livingstone, 1992)
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With the approval to construct the Johnston Atoll facility, the CSDP had
accomplished the concept development for the technology to destroy the stockpile and was
entering into the engineering development and prototype phase ofthe program. At this point
there was no actual operational data or production experience from which to estimate initial
program requirements. As a result the initial overall program costs were projected to be $3.2
billion. (Livingstone, 1992) Because the program did not meet the criteria for a major
acquisition program, there was no requirement for program reviews or the requisite
documentation that is required for major programs at Headquarters Department ofthe Army
(DA) or DoD level The PM reported to the Assistant Secretary ofthe Army (Installations,
Logistics, and Environment) (ASAILE) which had been designated as the oversight authority
for the acquisitions required by the program.
b. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years (FY) 1988 and
1989
This Act extended the stockpile elimination deadline from 1994 to April 30,
1997, and prohibited equipment prove out and systems testing of a full-scale demilitarization
facility in CONUS until Operation and Verification Testing (OVT) was successfully
completed at JACADS. It also required that the Army submit a Final Programmatic EIS on
the CSDP by January 1, 1988. The Record of Decision (ROD) that was required to be
submitted with the EIS identified on-site incineration as the preferred method of destruction.
(Foote, 1994) The overall affect of this legislation was to delay planning for the CONUS
facilities.
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c. National Defense Act for FY 1991
Congessional concern about the safety status and integrity of the stockpile
prompted this legislation. The Army was required to provide in its annual report to Congress
an estimate on how much longer the stockpile could continue to be stored safely. It also
required the Secretary ofDefense to develop a plan setting forth the steps that would be taken
if the stockpile deteriorated at a more accelerated rate than had been projected. (Foote,
1994) This requirement added to the documentation and paperwork burden ofthe PM.
d. House Committee on Appropriations Report for 1992
Although committee reports do not carry the force of law, agencies usually
comply with the recommendations, since ignoring such direction could place future funding
in jeopardy. This recommendation from the House Committee was for DoD to form a single
organization for all chemical destruction activities. The PM's office was reorganized to
include the non-stockpile program and renamed the United States Army Chemical Materiel
Destruction Agency. (Livingston, 1992) This change brought together the resources ofboth
the stockpile and non-stockpile programs and provided a single manager with oversight of all
the chemical weapon destruction programs.
e. National Defense Authorization Act for 1993
With the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for 1993,
Congress again extended the chemical weapons stockpile elimination deadline to December
31, 2004, to conform with treaty and diplomatic obligations. Congress also reacted to local
opposition to on-site incineration by requiring the Army to submit a report on potential
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alternative technologies to the baseline process selected for destruction ofthe stockpile. PL
No. 102-484, § 173(B) states:
...the Secretary of the Army may not commence site preparation for, or
construction of, a facility for disassembly and incineration of chemical agents
until the report required under subsection (a) is submitted to Congress.
It also required that the Army establish a Chemical Demilitarization Citizen's Advisory
Commission for any state in which there is a chemical munitions storage site. The purpose
of the Commission is to receive citizen and state concerns regarding the chemical
demilitarization program. (Foote, 1994) Again, program delays and solicitation schedule
changes were experienced until compliance with the requirement of the law was
accomplished.
f. Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1994
The FY 1994 Appropriations Act contained language that prohibits the
expenditure of funds for studies on the feasibility of removing and transporting unitary
chemical weapons from any ofthe eight CONUS stockpile sites. It also prohibits studies on
potential future uses ofthe nine chemical demilitarization facilities and extends the prohibition
on shipping chemical munitions to JACADS. Congress did provide that future uses ofthe
CAMDS facility at TEAD could be explored. (Foote, 1994)
C. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES
1. Acquisition Strategy for Facility Construction: 1984 thru 1991
Eight major contracts summarized in Table 3 were awarded between 1984 and 1991.
The contract types were Cost-Plus-Fixed Fee (CPFF) or Cost-Plus-Award Fee (CPAF). In
addition to the contracts set forth in Table 3, a Program and Integration Support Contract
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(PAISC) was awarded in March 1991. The PAISC is a contract to provide technical and
management support services to the PM to ensure program integration of all phases and areas
ofthe CSDP. This is a task order engineering services contract with ordering provisions for
CPFF and firm-fixed price (FFP) task orders. (AMCCOM, 1992)
Substantial cost growth over projections has been experienced in all the contracts,
except the training facilities contract. Cost growth has been attributed to construction
problems and delays experienced in the demilitarization systems contracts at Johnston Atoll
and TEAD, contractor coordination problems, delays in receipt ofEPA permits, and delays
in award ofplanned facility contracts at the remaining seven CONUS sites. (AMCCOM,
1992)
PURPOSE TYPE REMARKS
Design & Systems Integration CPFF A&E contract for design ofthe eight
CONUS demilitarizatiion faculties
JACAD Construction CPFF Construction at Johnston Atoll
JACAD Systemization CPFF Equipment Installation at Johnston Atoll
JACAD Operation CPFF Facility Operation at Johnston Atoll
Training Facility CPAF Construction of Training Facility at APG
Process Equipment Contracts (2)
(This equipment will be GFE for
the Facility contracts)
CPFF Design and Production ofthe special
process equipment for JACADS and
CONUS sites.
TEAD Facility CPAF Total package contract for construction,
systemization, and operation.
Table 3. Contracts in support of the CSDP as of October 1995 (AMCCOM, 1992)
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The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Logistics, and Environment
stated, "The JACADS contracting process clearly proved to be both cumbersome and
inefficient." (Livingstone, 1992) There were continuing disagreements over the points where
responsibilities started and ended, and contractor coordination and cooperation were difficult,
placing the program's objectives in jeopardy. (AMCCOM, 1992) This was attributed to
having three separate contractors for the construction, systemization, and operation phases
of the JACADS. In addition there were two contracts for the chemical processing and
emission abatement equipment to be furnished as Government furnished property (GFE) to
the construction and systemization contractors for installation and testing.
As a result of this experience, the Army decided to use the total systems contract
approach at TEAD to alleviate the problems encountered with JACADS. The TEAD facility
contract was for construction, systemization, operations, and close down. The contractor
was required to furnish commercially available equipment; however, the specialized process
and emissions abatement equipment remained as GFE.
Even with the total systems contracting change, the GAO predicted that design
changes, EPA requirements for test burns, funding shortfalls, and schedule delays would
impact the costs incurred under the TEAD contract. (GAO, 1990) Almost immediately it
became apparent that the project cost estimate was inadequate. Items that were not cost
factors for JACADS, such as the amount of reinforced steel needed to meet seismic zone 3
and explosive/vapor proofrequirements, surfaced and new requirements, such as a building
to handle containers, were identified. (Livingstone, 1992)
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By September 1991, the construction cost growth on the TEAD disposal facility had
increased from $49.6 million to $180 million. Construction stoppages occurred until
additional fiinds could be appropriated. (Livingstone, 1992) Delays caused the forecast for
demilitarization operations to be slipped to the Fall of 1995. Because of the problems
encountered in contract performance at the JACADS and TEAD facilities, the ASAILE, in
1992, undertook initiatives to improve management structure and control program cost
growth. The next section discusses the management changes initiated by the ASAILE, and
the contracting strategy planned for the remaining facility contracts.
2. Management Change Initiatives: 1992 through 1995
The multiple schedule delays and cost increases caused Congressional concern about
the management attention being provided for the CSDP. The life-cycle-cost estimate for the
Program Life-Cvcle Cost Estimate (T ,CC,F.) Siimmflrv
(dollars in millions)
Appropriation/ Funding Funding LCCE LCCE
Budget Actrvitv FY 1993 FY 1995 FY 1993 FY 1995
Research and $ 7 $ 20.7 $ 57 $ 267
Development
Procurement 245 199.0 2,162 2,766
Operations and
Maintenance 262 355.8 5,069 6,739
Military
Construction 15 24.0 1.243 1.317
Total $ 529 $599.5 $8,531 $11,089
Table 4. Program Life-Cycle Cost Summary
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program increased from $1.7 billion in 1988 to $1 1. 1 billion in 1995. The Army's Cost and
Economic Analysis Center expects the estimate to increase. Table 4 reflects the comparison
ofthe program's FY 1993 and the FY 1995 funding and the projected life cycle cost estimate
(LCCE) summary as ofthe end of each respective fiscal year. The Army attributed the cost
growth to unanticipated program requirements, higher costs for materials and technical and
programmatic delays. Schedule slippage was attributed to initial unrealistic milestone
schedules and subsequent management decisions to meet the schedules mandated by public
law. In October 1991, the ASARDA authorized the ASAILE to participate in the CSDP
programmatic acquisition functions and designated it as the CSDP decision authority. In
January 1992, the ASAILE directed that the CSDP be managed as an Army acquisition
program under the purview of a modified Army Systems Acquisition Review Council
(ASARC) process. The ASARC is the milestone decision and program review board for
nominated Army programs that are not designated as major defense acquisition programs.
The ASARC process for program milestone reviews contains many elements ofthe Defense





Vice Chiefof Staff of the Army joint approval on milestone documents.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Army for Operations and Research would
have approval authority for the Test and Evaluation Master Plan.
ASAILE would approve program documents including
• Acquisition Strategy Report.
• Mission-Need Statement.
• Operational Requirements Document.
• Integrated Program Summary.
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• Budget Cost Estimate.
• Acquisition Program Baseline Agreement.
• All Program Plans as required.
Three types ofASARC reviews were adopted by the ASAILE for the CSDP: (1) decision
reviews to approve major program milestones, (2) program reviews to fully assess program
status, and (3) special reviews conducted as needed. (DoD IG, 1994)
Between August 1993 and February 1994, the DoD Inspector General (IG) performed
an audit ofthe CSDP that recommended the program be elevated to DAB review status. The
IG pointed out that the program costs had exceeded the threshold for designation as a major
defense acquisition program (MDAP) and the level of congressional and public interest
justified a more disciplined program management process. After review ofthe program, the
Under Secretary ofDefense for Acquisition and Technology (US(A&T)) designed the CSDP
a Major Defense Acquisition Category (ACAT) ID Program subject to the DAB executive
reviews. (DoD IG, 1995) At that time the MDA reverted to the ASARDA with the PMCD
reporting directly to the ASAILE.
When the decision was made to subject the program to ASARC reviews the PMCD's
charter was revised to clarify the PM's responsibilities and authority. The charter revision
clearly delineated thresholds for senior level decision review of cost, schedule, and technical
performance parameters. In conjunction with this initiative the PMCD office was reorganized
to enhance overall management of the program. To ensure appropriate coordination and
accountability, field-level management changes were made to focus responsibility for all site-
specific activities on one individual. (Livingstone, 1992)
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Site-specific Configuration Control Boards were established to improve management
of change orders. This action was designed to clarify individual and cumulative approval
thresholds, assign responsibility for approval authority at each level, and ensure timely
communication of change order impacts on life-cycle costs and schedules. (Livingstone,
1992)
On February 6, 1992, the program's Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA)
including legal and procurement support authority was transferred from the Army COE to the
Army Materiel Command (AMC). The U.S. Army AMCCOM, now designed as the U.S.
Army Industrial Operations Command (IOC), was designated the AMC procuring office.
The IOC procuring contracting officer (PCO) will remain the PCO for the life of the
contracts. The administrative contracting officer (ACO) will be located at the Huntsville
Division of the COE for the construction phase through equipment installation. This
eliminated the procedure established by the COE for transferring the PCO responsibility
during execution of the projects and provides one contracting coordination point for
contractual issues. In addition to transferring the contracting authority for the CSDP, the
ASAILE directed that all active contracts for the program be evaluated for future transfer to
AMC. The purpose was to provide one face to industry for the PCO functions and legal
support of the program (Livingstone, 1992)
The following section will discuss the management changes since 1992 to enhance
program oversight and increase the coordination between activities involved in the program
It will also discuss how lessons from previous experiences are incorporated into the decision
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making process and the changes made in the CSDP contracting strategy during the last five
years.
3. Revised Contracting Strategy: 1992 through 1995
The contracting strategy for the JACADS contracts was heavily influenced by the
Competition in Contracting Act and the traditional way the COE contracted for design and
construction projects. Five full and open competition solicitations were issued, one for each
phase ofthe project. The resulting five contracts to three different contractors proved to be
an administration nightmare as the ASAILE indicated in testimony to Congress. The total
package contracting strategy for the Tooele disposal facility took into consideration the
lessons learned during the JACADS experience. However, as indicated above, even with
using the single systems contract approach, the GAO's prediction of schedule delays and cost
growth became reality. The GAO's prediction was partially based on the fact that the TEAD
contract was awarded prior to design completion (60 percent complete) to meet the milestone
mandated by PL 100-456, requiring stockpile destruction to be completed by April 30, 1997.
In 1992, ASAILE directed that no future request for proposals (RFP) would be released if
the design of the facility was incomplete. The ASAILE also directed that a FFP for the
construction and equipment installation phases of the system contract would be pursued.
(Livingstone, 1992)
As a result ofthe above directions, the contracting strategy for the CONUS facilities
was amended. The revised strategy provided for each remaining systems RFP to require
proposals be submitted in a format that separately priced each ofthe phases as follows:
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Process and Support Facility Construction.
Equipment Installation.
Preparation of Site- Specific Systems Operations and Maintenance Manuals.
Plant Startup.
Test and Acceptance.
Plant operations and Maintenance.
Closure ofthe Site.
Project management was to be set forth as a separately priced element, and was to span the
effort from award to contract completion. (AMCCOM, 1992)
The Acquisition Strategy document approved by the PDA requires that the remaining
systems contracts will be CPAF contracts with the line items for construction and equipment
installation being priced on a FTP basis. There is a caveat that provides that design must be
sufficiently complete to support the use of fixed pricing for construction and equipment
installation. There continue to be significant unknowns regarding the systemization and
operations phases ofthe program, and a cost-reimbursement arrangement is expected to be
used for these phases. Incentive fee arrangements are to be considered as more experience
in full-scale demilitarization operations is gained. (Livingstone, 1992)
Additional changes to be incorporated in future solicitations and the resulting
contracts include: (1) reduction in the amount of Government Furnished Eequipment (GFE)
to be furnished, (2) a specific cost proposal format to facilitate the formal source selection
process, (3) a restructured award fee plan, (4) a requirement to meet DoD standards of
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Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria and to report project compliance via a Cost
Performance Report, and (5) a two-month extension to the construction schedule in which
the contractor will be required to prepare a fully loaded network analysis schedule and
construction plan. (AMCCOM, 1992) The construction extension oftwo months is also to
be used for establishing a "partnering" relationship with the Government officials
administering the contract to facilitate communications and cooperation for the duration of
the project. (Livingstone, 1992) Solicitations will continue to be issued under the full and
open competition procedures.
The Army has actively applied the lessons learned from the JACADS and TEAD
facility contracting efforts to mitigate the forecast of continued cost growth and delays in the
CSDP. There remain significant issues that will require attention and astute management
solutions to ensure program success and destruction ofthe unitary chemical weapon stockpile
by the end of calendar year 2004. Some potential issues include contracting delays due to
budget reductions, EPA permit delays due to lack of resources and pressure from public
interest groups, indemnification problems due to in-plant accidental release oftoxic chemicals,
unforeseen maintenance for facilities, continued program cost increases due to delays and
increased program requirements, accelerated deterioration of the stored chemicals, and
natural disasters that may cause accidental release of toxic chemicals into the atmosphere.
Impacts to the program may also be caused by the recent acquisition reform initiatives.
D. SUMMARY
The unitary chemical weapon destruction program has evolved from the need to
eliminate obsolete and dangerous material in the United States weapons arsenal. The
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Congress recognizes the urgency surrounding the program as indicated by mandated deadlines
to complete the destruction process. The CWC further emphasizes the international interest
in bringing such warfare methods under control for the general welfare of the world's
population. The very nature ofthe weapons and the awesome damage that could result from
the accidental release of their toxic chemicals causes concern from all levels of the public
sector. Public interest from both short- and long- term health and environmental concerns are
issues that must be addressed and resolved.
In concert with the Congress and public interests the Army has developed a
management and acquisition strategy that has advanced the program through design,
development, and the low-rate initial destruction phases. Facility and equipment design and
testing parameters have been meticulously developed to meet health, safety, and
environmental criteria as well as some ofthe public concern in these areas.
The CSDP progressed to the critical phase of full-scale destruction of deadly toxic
weapons. The PM is now in the process ofmaking contract awards for the construction of
the CONUS destruction facilities to eliminate the stockpile. The design ofthese facilities and
the equipment to be installed has been based on years of prototype development, testing,
public scrutiny, and EPA permit requirements. The PM must now step back and apply the
acquisition reform initiatives on specifications and standards to the CSDP.
The next chapter will provide a background of acquisition reform initiatives. The
acquisition reform initiative background will be followed by a discussion of efforts directed
toward the June 1994 DoD policy on specifications and standards when acquiring goods and
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services for the military. Last the Army implementation plan for the DoD specifications and
standards reform effort is provided.
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m. ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES
Numerous attempts have been made to reform the Federal Government acquisition
system. The Dockery Commission of 1893 was established to look at Federal administrative
activities including contracting. The Dockery Commission report included a finding of
widespread duplication of contracting functions and a failure to use standardized
specifications in Federal purchasing. The recommendations from the 1905 Keep Commission
and the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency of 1912 also urged reform of the
Federal acquisition system. (Pegnato, 1995) The following section examines some of the
major Federal acquisition reform and streamlining recommendations.
A. MAJOR ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES
The first major statute regulating the procurement process was, "The Armed Forces
Procurement Act of 1947." This Act generated the Armed Services Procurement Regulation,
which was approximately 125 pages long. Since 1947 many Congressional commissions,
such as the Hoover Commission (1955), Fitzhugh Commission (1970), Commission on
Government Procurement (1972), Grace Commission (1983), and Packard Commission
(1986) have made major recommendations for reform and change to the acquisition
procedures. (Fox, 1988) More recently there has been the Defense Management Review
Report (1989), the Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Acquisition Reform
(1993), and the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel (1993) also known at the "Section 800
Panel." (Foreman, 1994) Each ofthese efforts recommended use of commercial practices
as a method to increase quality and reduce acquisition costs. Use of commercial practices has
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been interpreted to include items such as: the adoption of commercial business processes, the
elimination of nonvalue-added oversight and controls, and the use of commercial
specifications and standards in lieu of rigorous military design specifications.
In 1984, Congress passed the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) which changed
many ofthe aspects ofhow the contracting process worked. One ofthe basic provisions of
CICA is that specifications must be sufficiently definitive so as to permit competition on a
common basis. CICA and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) implementing CICA
require that specifications be developed in such a manner as is necessary to obtain full and
open competition. The policy set forth at FAR 10.002 (b) states:
Acquisition policies and procedures shall require descriptions of agency
requirements, whenever practicable to be stated in terms of functions to be
performed or performance required.
There are several reasons that requiring activities continue to use defense-unique
specifications and standards. Many specification developers for the DoD interpreted the
policy that agencies specify their needs in a manner designed to promote full and open
competition as the need to use military specifications and standards. It was felt that the use
of these defense unique specifications and standards ensured that offerors were submitting
proposals on the same item. Ifeach offeror is permitted to define the specifications for itself
as may be the case with performance or functional specifications, to the extent that offerors
do so differently, they are not competing on an equal basis. (Doke, 1995)
By use ofthe defense prepared military specifications and standards, it was perceived
that protection was provided to the Government in the event of a protest based on
interpretation ofthe requirement. Personnel that develop requirements for the Government's
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supplies and services realize that performance specifications leave to the contractor the
responsibility ofchoosing the means, methods, and techniques for accomplishing the contract
work. Often these requiring activities feel strongly about the methods and techniques that are
to be used in the production of goods and services of which they are the ultimate users.
Safety and logistical considerations often cause use of military specifications and standards
in an effort to reduce the risks of the receipt ofnonconforming supplies. Additionally, the
conversion of specifications into performance or functional statements of requirements is
difficult and there is little or no training available in this area. (Doke, 1995)
The above circumstances are a few ofthe reasons that attempts to restrict the practice
ofusing established military specifications and standards have not been successful in the past
acquisition reform efforts. It must also be recognized that parochial interests have also played
a role in delaying the timely execution of conversion from military specifications and
standards to commercial equivalents.
The most recent reform effort was initiated by Congress in Section 800 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1991, P.L. 101-5 10. This report was delivered
to the Congress in the spring of 1992 and was the first initiative in developing a DoD position
on recommendations for legislative change for the acquisition system Using the guidelines
provided by Vice President Gore's National Performance Review and the recommendations
ofthe Advisory Panel on Strearnlining and Codifying Acquisition Laws (Section 800 Panel),
the Defense Science Board, numerous commissions, and experts within DoD, Secretary of
Defense Perry developed the DoD vision of a re-engineered acquisition system (Perry, 1994)
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The following section will discuss the DoD policy on specifications and standards as
set forth in Secretary Perry's white paper entitled "Acquisition Reform, A Mandate for
Change," the DoD Process Action Team (PAT) report entitled "Blueprint for Change," and
Secretary Perry's memorandum entitled "A New Way of Doing Business." Finally, a
discussion of the Army's implementation plan for the DoD's specification and standards
policy will be provided.
B. DOD POLICY CHANGE BACKGROUND
In February 1994, Secretary ofDefense Perry published a white paper that discussed
dramatic changes in the DoD acquisition processes in order to meet military security
challenges of the United States and to reduce acquisition costs. The paper states that the
problem with the DoD's acquisition system is a complex web of laws, regulations, and
policies, adopted for laudable reasons over many years. One ofthe examples provided was
as follows:
Military specifications were adopted to ensure DoD got a quality product that
would meet the user's needs while using a procurement process that would
allow it to buy from the lowest bidder; and to ensure standardization to enable
ease of logistics support.... (Perry, February 1994)
Perry characterized the DoD acquisition system as an "industrial era bureaucracy in an
information age." (Perry, February 1994) One ofthe philosophies still being adhered to is
use of detailed design and how-to specifications as the only way to ensure an acceptable
product, and to ensure a level playing field for competition. To reengineer the acquisition
system the Secretary of Defense identified focus areas for concentrated efforts in the near
term One of those focus areas was the DoD acquisition process or more specifically, how
42
we identify what we buy. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform
(DUSD(AR)) was appointed as the focal point for the development and implementation of
a coherent and practical step-by-step plan. The implementation plan for the DoD reform
process targeted certain segments ofthe acquisition system that promised to yield immediate
and substantial improvements. One of those focus areas was the issue of defense-unique
product and process specifications and standards. (Perry, February 1994)
1. Specifications and Standards Process Action Team
The DUSD(AR) chartered a PAT to address the defense-unique specifications and
standards issue. The PAT tasking was to analyze why Federal Government specifications and
standards were continuing to be preferred despite the three-year-old DoD policy preference
for commercial standards. The team was chartered to develop a plan to implement a
preference for commercial and performance standards unless a military specification is the
only practical alternative. (Perry, February, 1994)
The team acknowledged that it was unlikely that a time would come when all defense
needs could be satisfied with commercial specifications and processes. The PAT also
conceded that there were no universal solutions or overnight panaceas that would enable the
conversion ofthe military specifications and standards program into a commercially amicable
system A fundamental problem identified at the beginning ofthe review process was that
military specifications and standards are written and applied inappropriately and not tailored
to the specific procurement situation. Either oftwo major problems may develop when this
occurs: (1) the technology described is obsolete or, (2) the amount of how-to direction
prevents exploration of other ways of achieving the desired result. The goal of the PAT
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became to maximize the overlap between DoD needs and commercial capabilities. (Process
Action Team, 1994)
Six priority areas were identified by the PAT to focus the reform effort. The areas
identified were as follows:
Performance-Based Specifications.
Eliminating Excessive Contract Requirements.
Overhauling the Standards Process.
Integrating New Management Tools.
Increased Training and Education.
Leadership Commitment.
The PAT recommendations in each ofthese areas were published in the team's report in April
1994. The report of the PAT included projected milestones expected to complete the
recommended actions and projections for funding that would be needed to accomplish the
recommendations. (Process Action Team, 1994) The recommendations of the PAT were
endorsed by the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum addressed to the Military
Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others on June 29, 1994. The memorandum is
attached at Appendix D. This memorandum represents the most forceful policy statement to
be issued by DoD in the area of specification and standards reform It not only dictated
multiple and critical policy changes, but directed the reprogramming offunds for FY94 and
FY95 to begin implementation of the recommendations. The Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies were also directed to program
funding for FY96 and beyond to support the efforts required to accomplish conversion efforts
in the out years. (Perry, June 1994) The directions provided in the Perry memorandum and
the potential funding impact ofthe program are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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2. DoD Policy on Specifications and Standards
The most significant policy change in the Secretary ofDefense memorandum was the
direction that performance specifications shall be used when purchasing new systems, major
modifications, upgrades to current systems, and nondevelopmental and commercial items, for
programs in any acquisition category. Military specifications and standards are to be
authorized only as a last resort and require a waiver approved by the MDA, or in the case of
ACAT ID programs, the waiver must be granted by the Component Acquisition Executive
(CAE). Secretary Perry then directed that the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) include language encouraging contractors to propose non-Government
standards and industry-wide practices. He encouraged the Military Departments and
Directors of the Defense Agencies to exercise existing authority to insert language as
proposed by the PAT in solicitations and current contracts. The memorandum also advised
PMs that military specifications and standards listed in the DoD Instruction 5000.2 should
be viewed as for guidance only. The Secretary also directed that military specifications and
standards below the first-tier references in the equipment/product specifications were to be
considered as guidance only. (Perry, June 1994)
Five new directions were set forth as action items in the memorandum. Those
initiatives are as follows:
1. Management and Manufacturing Specifications and Standards: The US(AT)
develop a plan for canceling, inactivating, transferring to non-Government
standards, converting to performance based specifications, or justifying their
retention.
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2. Configuration Control: The Government maintain control ofthe functional
and performance requirements only. Make contractors responsible for the
detailed design.
3. Obsolete Requirements: The US(AT) develop a procedure for identifying and
removing obsolete requirements from the DoD Index of Specifications and
Standards and the Acquisition Management System and Data Requirements
Control List.
4. Partnerships: Encouraged US(AT) to form partnerships with industry
associations to develop non-Government standards for replacement of military
standards where practicable.
5. Reduction ofOversight: Reduce direct Government oversight by substituting
process controls and non-Government standards in place of development
and/or production testing and inspection to include mintary-unique quality
assurance systems. (Perry, June 1994)
The PAT understood that the magnitude of this change would require altering the
fundamental way that PMs, requiring activities, users, and contracting offices viewed
requirements definition. Collectively the changes prescribed constitute a dramatic cultural
change. The Secretary of Defense recognized the need to address cultural changes in his
memorandum by setting forth the following directions to the acquisition community.
1. Challenge Requirements: Acquisition decision makers at all level are expected
to challenge requirements as the problem is rooted in the requirements
determination phase ofthe acquisition cycle.
2. Reduce/Eliminate Toxic Pollutants: Establish department and agency
programs to identify and reduce or eliminate toxic pollutants procured or
generated through the use of specifications and standards.
3. Training and Education: US(AT) shall ensure that training and education
programs are revised to include specifications and standards reform
4. Milestone Reviews: MDAs will review programs at all levels to ensure that
streamlining both in the contract and in the oversight process is being pursued.
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5. Appoint Standards Improvement Executives (SDE): Departments and
Agencies shall appoint SIEs to support those carrying out acquisition reform,
direct implementation of specification and standards reform program, and
participate on the Defense Standards Improvement Council.
Finally, the Secretary encouraged management commitment in establishing the
environment essential for implementing the cultural changes needed for implementation and
execution of a successfiil program Strong leadership would be required at all levels ofthe
Military Departments and Defense Agencies to accomplish the vision set forth in the PAT
report. (Perry, June 1994)
The funding impacts identified and projected by the PAT beginning in FY94 and
extending through FY99 are set forth in Table 5 entitled "Cost Summary of PAT
Recommendations." (Process Action Team, 1994) Offsetting cost savings were not projected
FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 TOTAL
Standards Program 50.9 48.2 45.8 43.5 41.2 39.1 268.7


















Pollution Prevention 1.6 21.1 16.5 16.5 16.5 72.2
National Standards 1.9 2.0 .7 .7 .7 6.0
Convert Mfg & Mgmt
Specs and Stds 2.6 7.7 5.9 16.2
Obsolete Specifications 2.0 1.0 .1 .1 .1 3.3
TOTAL 73.4 101.5 87.2 75.7 71.5 50.6 459.9
Table 5. Cost Summary of PAT Recommendations
(In Millions of Dollars)
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by the PAT although the PAT acknowledged that lower acquisition costs should be realized
after implementation ofthe team's recommendations.
On December 6, 1995, the Secretary of Defense (Perry, December 1995) issued a
memorandum, see Appendix E, that encouraged contractors to propose non-Government
specifications and industry-wide standards to replace Government-unique requirements on
current contracts. The memorandum authorized the ACO to use block changes to the
management and manufacturing requirements within a facility when such changes would be
technically acceptable to the Government. The purpose ofthe memorandum was to put into
place a method to expedite the transition of existing contracts to use of commercial
specifications and standards thus promoting uniform, efficient facility-wide management and
manufacturing systems. (Perry, 1995)
C. ARMY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
The Army Implementation Plan (AJP) for achieving the DoD PAT recommendations
was issued in November 1994. It outlined specific actions to be taken and established policy
tailored to the Army acquisition community. Unless clarification or specific instruction was
required, the AJP avoided duplication of the PAT's analysis, recommendations, action
agendas, and impact and risk assessments. The AIP stressed the two main aspects of the
military specifications and standards reform effort, (1) the use of military specifications and
standards and (2) the replacing or revision of military specifications and standards. (AIP,
1994)
Each Army Acquisition Organization (AAO) was required to establish its own
approach and document its method to accomplish the required reforms in its own Master
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Action Plan (MAP). The AIP identified the waiver authority for other than new ACAT
programs as the AAO Commander, Director, or the Program Executive Officer (PEO). The
waiver criteria were set out in detail although the AIP specifically advised that the AAO and
the PEO should tailor internal processes to match their actual procurement environment and
to accomplish the goals of streamlining the acquisition process. MAP preparation and
approval criteria were established in the AIP to ensure that approval authorities were at a
sufficiently high level to provide the AAOs with incentives to establish an aggressive action
plan. The AAO plans were required to be reviewed by the activities SIE and submitted to the
ASARDA by February 1, 1995. (AIP, 1994)
The Army set a goal to review and cancel or convert the maximum number ofArmy
used military specifications and standards by luly 1, 1996. Each MAP must list the number
ofAAO prepared/owned military specifications and standards and a comprehensive plan to
reduce or eliminate those specifications and standards. The MAP is to prioritize efforts by
targeting high pay-off areas based upon available resources and provide milestones for plan
accomplishment.
The Army implementation ofthe performance specification preference was expanded
to apply the PAT recommendation to all solicitations which included rebuys of ACAT
systems, non-ACAT programs, procurement of services, replenishments, and spares. The
deadline by which all solicitations must comply or be granted waivers in accordance with the
prescribed procedure was set for December 23, 1994. (AIP, 1994) The management and
manufacturing specifications and standards recommendation made by the PAT was the second
area of stringent implementation by the AIP. The Army's guidance requires that statements
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ofwork (SOW) be performance-based and specify only what functional work the contractor
is to accomplish, not how the work is to be done. The guidance prescribes the use of the
Army's Functional Support Templates to streamline SOWs and requires that a Functional
Requirements Authentication Board (FRAB) be established to validate that the Templates
have been applied and that SOWs are integrated and performance-based, and to ensure that
the SOW uses performance specifications. (AIP, 1994)
The AMC Pamphlet dated March 24, 1995, contains the Functional Support
Templates prescribed by the AIP. The templates were developed to assist PEOs, PMs, and
Commanders to determine the minimum essential functional matrix support needed for the
management of acquisition programs. The intent ofthe templates was to stimulate thought
about specific functional requirements and to question proposed solutions to those
requirements. In particular, they encourage review of those requirements for functional
support and those that add contract costs but result in little or no value added to the
acquisition program. The templates are to be used at the earliest stages of an acquisition
program to assist in identifying alternative approaches to the traditional methods used to
specify requirements. By using the templates, requiring activities are forced to focus on
alternatives that result in reduced oversight, inspections, and cost. (AMC, 1995) The AMC
has developed the templates as a result of the Army "Road Show" efforts to scrub
solicitations and requirement documents. At this time there is an initiative by the DoD
Acquisition Reform Under Secretary to promulgate the templates into a DoD document for
use by all Services in efforts to streamline the acquisition process. (Moore, 1995)
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D. SUMMARY
In this chapter a number of initiatives for reform and streamlining of the Federal
acquisition process were reviewed. This review culminated in the explanation ofthe most
recent policy direction by the Secretary of Defense to move the procurement system away
from use of unique Government specifications to commercial standards and performance
specifications. The Army implementation plan for the DoD policy was defined along with
discussion ofthe AMC preference for performance specifications as demonstrated by its use
of functional support templates for solicitation reviews.
The following chapter will address the process to accomplish the conversion to non-
government unique specifications or standards and performance specifications.
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IV. CSDP SPECIFICATION REFORM
The CSDP is unique in that it is not a weapon systems production program, but a
weapon systems destruction program Congress has mandated a destruction schedule that
takes into consideration the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that is before
it awaiting ratification. Time schedules are critical for the purpose of abiding by the terms of
the CWC and because of the deteriorating condition ofthe weapon containers. The safety
ofpersonnel operating the facilities, adjacent workforce, and residents ofthe immediate area
is critical. The safety factor could cause major delays due to unforeseen natural hazardous
conditions, mechanical failure, human error, and pressure from special interest groups such
as Greenpeace, Common Cause, and the Sierra Club. Environmental compliance issues will
provide an avenue of continuing cause of delay as it is critical that all aspects ofthe planned
disposal methods be thoroughly reviewed prior to issuance of necessary permits. Public
interest must be addressed and the process ofkeeping the public informed is time consuming,
and ifnot delivered appropriately, can have an adverse effect on the issuance of approvals to
proceed with contract performance. The inability to project program costs more accurately
has contributed to congressional concern. If schedules are lengthened, it is likely that costs
ofthe CSDP will grow and may escalate by at least the amount of inflation that occurs over
the period oftime that schedule slippage is experienced.
Acquisition reform initiatives must now be factored into the equation by the CSDP
planners. The conversion of military specifications and standards to commercial equivalent
or performance specifications must be considered in the schedule milestones for solicitation
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issuance and contract award. Delays in these areas could ultimately cause the weapons
destruction schedules to be compromised. With any potential schedule delay there is a high
probability of associated cost increases. Resources will be expended to determine the scope
of the effort, for the review of current documents, for the conversion of current military
specifications and standards to performance specifications, and for the processing ofwaivers
if applicable.
The following section will provide a prospective on the effort involved in conversion
of military specifications and standards to comply with the acquisition reform initiative on
preference for performance or commercial specifications. The specification conversion
process section will be followed by sections that discuss the potential effects on schedules and
cost to accomplish the conversion and provide some insight on how the conversion process
may affect EPA approvals and certification requirements. The final section ofthis chapter will
address the influences that the conversion may have on the contractual instruments for the
CSDP and how contractor performance will be evaluated.
A. THE SPECIFICATION CONVERSION PROCESS
The responses to the interview survey questions and telephonic interviews with
personnel from the contracting, COE, PM, HQAMC, HQDA, and DoD offices indicate there
are a minimum of three and potentially as many as six levels of review of the procurement
documents for the CSDP program. The COE is the primary review office for the construction
phase of the program. The PM's office has the overall responsibility to ensure that all the
documents provided to the contracting office have been examined for compliance with DoD
policy. The contracting office then performs a solicitation "scrub" to identify any remaining
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specifications that would be potential candidates for conversion to commercial or
performance. In addition to these reviews the AMC headquarters policy and compliance
review teams may perform a review for compliance with the AIP and apply the templates to
the proposed solicitation documents. The Overarching Integrated Process Action Team
(OIPT) for the CSDP may also address areas contained in the solicitation that need to be
considered for changes during their assessment conducted prior to the DAB program reviews.
The DAB can also recommend and direct changes to the program documents as a result of
their program reviews. The following sections will discuss the review process at each level.
1. The Army Corps of Engineers Review Process
The Huntsville Corps ofEngineers District office was the procuring contracting office
until February 1992, when the program contracting was consolidated at the IOC. As a result
they are fully familiar with the construction design package prepared by Parsons, the Architect
and Engineering contractor for the CSDP facility. The COE has also been the ACO
responsible for overseeing the construction at Johnston Atoll and Tooele. The Huntsville
office will continue to be designated as the ACO for all future planned construction contracts
for this program (LoehrL, 1996)
In the COE specification review process, the facility design factors are taken into
consideration. Any changes to the facility design package requires coordination with Parson,
the PM office, and COE internal quality and engineering staffs before any recommendation
for conversion to commercial or performance specifications can be finalized. The factor of
safety ofoperations would be the primary concern. Emission elevation risks would need to
55
be applied, and the EPA permitting authorities would be involved if there was a possibility
that current standards may be compromised. (COE Survey, 1996)
The chemical destruction facility design package was completed prior to the
specification policy change. As this is a construction contract and safety is the primary
concern of the program, COE efforts to review the design package have been minimal.
Service and construction contracts are the lowest priority for compliance review under DoD
policy since service contracts normally use performance-oriented specifications, and
.
construction contracts tend to use commercial standards. Personnel in the Huntsville office
advised that construction design is primarily based on commercial practices, therefore the
actual construction should not require many unique Government or military specifications.
The equipment to be installed and the emission levels are the critical areas for concentration
of the design review. Their current procurement package review process utilizes a
constructability team concept that includes members from all technical and engineering areas
that have an interest in the requirement. Each team member reviews the proposed solicitation
construction requirement to ensure that all relevant interfaces are addressed, that the
technology level is available or will be available to perform the construction required, and that
appropriate performance parameters are included . (COE Interview, 1996)
2. The Program Manager Review Process
In early 1994 the PM's acquisition office formed a team to examine all solicitations
with the intent to make as many changes to commercial and performance specifications as
possible. All technical and engineering offices involved in the CSDP were represented either
as a member of the team or were asked to coordinate on team recommendations. Team
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members included representatives from the COE and the IOC. About 750 hours were spent
on the initial scrub of solicitations being prepared for issuance. This review did not include
the construction design package. As a result ofthe review, all but one military specification
that was called out in the solicitation were converted to performance. The one military
specification retained was the demilitarization training specification. The program had
invested over $40 million in the training process and there were critical environmental and
safety risks that could result if proper operating procedures were not followed. The PM
requested and obtained a waiver from the MDA to retain the training specification in the
solicitation. The PM believes that significant benefits will accrue to the program from use of
performance specifications. (Bushman, 1996)
Monthly reviews are conducted ofthe equipment designated for the facilities. About
one sixth ofthe total GFE requirements are targeted for these monthly reviews. In this way
the entire list is reviewed every six months. These reviews include the equipment design
component as well as the operating contractors and are focused on commercializing the
equipment at the facilities. Extensive coordination includes the equipment designer to make
sure that critical environmental and safety considerations are addressed, the EPA to ensure
RCRA permits will not be affected, and the contracting office in conjunction with the
operating contractor for the conversion modification. To further this effort to commercialize
the GFE, offerors on active solicitations are encouraged to provide alternate
recommendations in their proposals. In addition to the equipment changes, another outcome
ofthese ongoing monthly efforts has been that several contract data requirements list (CDRL)
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items have been eliminated. In one instance the contractor processes were adopted for the
maintenance management plan in lieu ofusing a military specified process. (Bushman, 1996)
In addition to the above ongoing reviews, the PM office formed a CSDP Concept
Review Team (CCRT) in September 1995 to examine methods for achieving significant cost
reductions in the stockpile disposal effort. This integrated process team (IPT) was not
constrained in examination of alternatives with the one exception that all laws governing
demilitarization must be fully met. One of the initiatives of the CCRT is to make
recommendations for changes to increase the use of performance specifications, with an
emphasis on the systemization, closure, and support elements of the current contracts and
solicitations. (PM-CSD, 1995)
3. The Contracting Office Review Process
The contracting office at the IOC is asked to coordinate the PM and COE review
efforts and to provide recommendations regarding the potential affect of changes on contract
cost and performance. In addition to these coordination requirements, the contracting office
performs RFP scrubs. These scrubs are performed at the IOC Headquarters and include
representatives from the COE, PM, and the installation where the facility is to be constructed.
The IOC functional areas including legal and procurement policy analysts also participate.
There are normally two meetings that last two to three days each. The purpose ofthe initial
meeting is to go through the RFP page by page as a group and try to reach consensus on the
recommendations for changes. Each specification call-out is identified and then checked
against a listing of exempted specifications. The specification is then reviewed to determine
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if it can be converted to a performance specification or if an equivalent commercial
specification exists.
After the initial meeting, the solicitation is revised and distributed to the individual
members. After allowing time for individual review, a second meeting is held for the purpose
ofincorporation of comments and finalization ofthe revised document. If any contentious
issues remain after this meeting, another meeting may be required to resolve the
disagreements. The purpose ofthe scrub is to identify areas that, not only could be converted
to performance or commercial specifications, but requirements that should be considered for
deletion or revision to eliminate redundancy. The scrubs are designed to ensure that only
needed requirements are included in the solicitation. At the time of the scrub, the AMC
templates are applied to ensure all pertinent questions are asked and each requirement has a
valid need to be included. These scrubs do not include the construction technical data as that
is the domain ofthe COE. (Loehrl, 1996)
Solicitation Review Boards are held just prior to the release ofthe RFP to comply
with the regulatory requirement offormal solicitation reviews. A draft RFP was used for the
ANAD requirement, however that practice was not used for the PBA, PUDA, or UMDA
RFPs. The solicitations have become more standardized with each solicitation that is
released. The first solicitations did not allow alternate proposals due to the critical safety
parameters. Although these critical safety parameters have not been relaxed, the PM
determined that alternate proposals could be considered ifthey were within the performance
requirements. By allowing alternate proposals, contractors can now make recommendations
for conversions to commercial or performance specifications. The solicitations that are now
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under evaluation, PBA and UMDA, and the PUDA solicitation issued in early February 1996,
allow and encourage alternate proposals. The ANAD solicitation was issued in 1992, well
before the DoD policy memorandum providing direction on commercial and performance
specifications. (Loehrl, 1996)
4. Other Levels in the Review Process
TheAMC periodically requests solicitations for review prior to issuance for proposals.
Usually theAMC selects solicitations for major weapon systems. Although the CSDP is an
ACAT ED program, it is considered to be a construction, services program and the
headquarters has not requested any ofthe program's solicitations at this date. However, the
headquarters always has the authority to request a review if it is deemed appropriate. At this
time with significant oversight being provided from other sources, personnel at the AMC feel
an added review would be redundant. They are also satisfied that the PM and contracting
office are applying the templates as prescribed by AMC policy, as the IOC has obtained the
Army training in this area. The headquarters AMC does review any requests for waivers to
use other than performance or commercial specifications and makes recommendations to the
MDA regarding approval. (Moore, 1995)
The offices of the ASARDA and the ASAILE analyze and comment on all
documentation prior to DAB reviews. Both offices participate in the OEPT meetings prior
to DAB in-process-reviews. During their assessment, they ensure that appropriate actions
have been taken to convert military unique specifications to commercial or performance
requirements. Ultimately, the DAB queries any requirements that are not in compliance with
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the DoD specification policy and ensures that appropriate waivers have been obtained.
(Oscar, 1995)
B. CONVERSION PROCESS AFFECT ON SCHEDULES AND COST
Telephone interviews were conducted in conjunction with responses to the interview
survey questions to collect the data for this section. Responses were received from the IOC
contracting office, the Huntsville Division of the Army COE Chemical Demilitarization
Directorate, and the CSDP PM office. These offices are the primary organizations that would
expend effort in the specification reviews as indicated in the previous section. This section
will discussion the resources used and schedule impacts by each ofthese primary offices to
comply with the DoD specification and standards policy.
1. Corps of Engineers Cost and Schedule Impact
The Huntsville office ofthe COE has estimated that to perform the review required
by the DoD policy, specifically aimed at identifying and listing the military unique
specifications in the design package, would cost about $250,000 per solicitation based on an
estimated 3,000 hours of effort. This effort could take from three to six months depending
on the extent ofcoordination requirements and whether the EPA is required to coordinate due
to a potential change to a specification that has been cited in the RCRA permit (COE Survey,
1996). In addition to the design package review, the constructability team, referred to in the
section above, would continuously monitor new and on-going requirements for the program
to ensure compliance with the DoD specification policy. This team usually consists of about
15 members and the overall effort requires about a 1.5 resource year effort. The members
review each construction package individually and may have a number of formal meetings
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prior to reaching full agreement and finalization of the procurement documents. (COE
Interview, 1996)
The COE survey indicated that there should be no schedule impact on the CSDP due
to their reviews. The constructability review is included in the contracting milestones for each
solicitation. Review for compliance with the DoD specification policy should not require a
longer period of time than is currently used for these reviews. The COE does not plan to
expend anymore effort than the estimated 3,000 hours of initial effort on the Parson's design
package (COE Survey, 1996). One Huntsville Division COE source indicated that it is
doubtful that the design package will require changes for future solicitations. This source
advised that most construction specifications are already commercial or performance-
oriented. The area that would be most likely to call out military specifications would be the
special demilitarization equipment to be installed in the facility. The specification of this
equipment is the responsibility ofthe PM, thus it is highly unlikely that the equipment reviews
would impact COE schedules. (COE Interview, 1996)
2. Program Management Office Cost and Schedule Impact
After the DoD policy was issued in June of 1994, the PM office formed a team to
review all the current solicitations for the CSDP. About 750 hours were expended in this
review to convert as many specifications as possible to performance. All specifications that
did not comply with the DoD policy, with the exception of the one training specification
referred to in the preceding section, were converted to performance. It is estimated that
approximately 100 hours each month is used on a continuing basis to ferret out any "how to"
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language found in solicitations and current contracts. Then efforts are made to convert that
language to performance-oriented wording. (Bushman, 1996)
It is estimated that an additional 400 to 500 hours a month is spent in the ongoing
acquisition strategy reviews in the PM office. The acquisition strategy effort is aimed toward
reduction of CDRL requirements or converting those requirements to commercial format.
The strategy review is also looking at the maintenance management plan for the facilities.
These reviews are to ensure that commercial specifications are maximized and to identify any
areas that may have been overly specified due to the safety and environmental concerns.
(Bushman, 1996)
The other major effort within the PM office is the review of the equipment
specifications. The equipment for each site costs about $100 million. About 75 percent of
that equipment was unique military specified GFE designed specifically for the CSDP.
Currently the efforts to identify alternate commercially available equipment have resulted in
a decrease ofGFE to about 60 percent ofthe total equipment needed to be procured for each
facility. That means that an estimated $15 million worth ofadditional equipment is now being
bought using competitive solicitations. To convert one piece ofequipment that is called out
as GFE to contractor procured commercial equipment can take up to six months of effort.
(Bushman, 1996)
The survey from the PM office indicated that they had not experienced any delays in
the program schedule due to the DoD specification policy. Other program delays, most of
which were caused by the EPA permits process, had allowed more than sufficient time to
complete their initial reviews. The ongoing reviews will not cause delays in the current
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contracts as the equipment for the Johnston Atoll and Tooele contracts is already procured.
The changes in the solicitation requirements from GFE to CFE has not been a cause of delay
in receipt ofproposals or contract awards as of this date.
3. Contracting Office Cost and Schedule Impact
According to the PCO at the IOC, the contracting office has expended very little
effort over and above its normal solicitation scrubs and solicitation review boards due to the
DoD specification policy. RFP shrubs have always questioned requirements that were not
stated in terms of performance. Application of the AMC templates is expressly for the
purpose of elimination ofredundant and excess requirements that only serve to increase cost
and add no value. The contracting office provided a representative to the PM's office during
their initial review of solicitations to comply with the June 1994 policy guidance. However,
the contracting officer considered that support to be minimal and was probably included in
the estimate the PM had provided for the cost of that review. The contracting office has not
kept records on the time expended in the specification review process. The office is
completely dedicated to and resourced by the CSDP PM, therefor, all effort in that division
is expended toward that program (Loehrl, 1996)
The contracting office could not attribute any of the solicitation issuance, source
selection board, or contract award delays to the review for conversion of specifications to
commercial or performance specifications. Changes to the solicitations were of such
magnitude that any specification change that was included in these amendments would not
have in and ofthemselves been cause for the time extensions granted due to the changes. Any
GFE to CFE changes that occurred during the source selection process were included in the
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discussion and negotiation phase ofthe process, thus allowing the proposers to address those
changes in their best and final offers. For the most part, delays have been experienced for
reasons other than solicitation changes. The most significant delay factor has been obtaining
the necessary RCRA permits to allow award. Most of these delays have been driven by
political pressures brought to bear by environmental groups and congressional constituents
in the locale where facilities are purposed for construction. (LoehrL, 1996)
The CSDP schedule provided in the program acquisition strategy ofFebruary 1992
for the eight CONUS demilitarization facilities is compared to the revised program schedule
as of February 1996 in Figure 3. Each schedule bar depicts the three major phases of the
contract. The first phase is construction of the demilitarization facility. The second major
phase is systemization of the facility, including installation of equipment to perform
demilitarization and testing of equipment. The third phase is demilitarization operations
during which the lethal chemicals are destroyed. The close down phase will add
approximately three months to each schedule. (AMCCOM, 1992; PMCD, 1996)
C. AFFECTS ON EPA APPROVAL AND CERTIFICATION
Information provided by answers to the survey questions and interviews indicate
concern in this area. Most responses were framed in the context of the delays that could
occur in receiving permits to proceed with the work under the contracts. The comments
provided for this question are discussed in the following paragraphs.
The COE survey response indicates that the EPA will be involved in the specification
conversion process when the conversion to performance or commercial specifications affect















































































Figure 3. CSDP Contract Schedules (AMCCOM, 1992; PMCD, 1996)
specification or standard that was included because of specific results from the CAMDS or
JACADS operational testing, our quest to change that specification could cause additional
permitting delays. The quality assurance area was specified as the area of greatest concern,
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although it was not anticipated that the EPA would require any additional testing. One ofthe
goals ofthe COE is to screen the specification conversions to ensure that program risk would
not increase or the risk to any one party to the contract did not change as a result of
conversions. (COE Survey, 1996)
The contracting officer felt that there would be significant impact to the program if
EPA is asked to change the basis for the RCRA permits. Current permits were issued based
on demonstrated performance at the JACADS facility. The public has been assured that the
Army is operating and will continue to operate at the safety levels established and maintained
at the test facilities. Ifthe Government should now convert specifications that have proven
to produce a specified level of safety, this may be construed by the public that the Army
cannot be relied upon to keep its word that all facilities would be built and operated in the
same manner. The public watch groups can be relied upon to make the EPA aware ofthese
concerns and could bring pressure on the EPA There is a great deal ofuncertainty involved
in what may happen in the public area. Public forums must be heard and iftheir confidence
is eroded the program will be impacted. The degree of impact is difficult to predict. (Loehrl,
1996)
From the PM office representative's perspective, it was not felt that the conversion
to performance and commercial specifications would delay the EPA permitting process.
However, the representative acknowledged that it was unlikely that the public interest groups
general opposition to the use of the incineration method to dispose of the lethal chemicals
contained in the weapons being destroyed would change. When any conversion is
contemplated by the PM office, the EPA permit requirements are reviewed to ensure that no
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quality or safety level is altered that would lower the levels of performance on which the
permits were based. The operating contractor is required to sign the RCRA permit with the
Government. The representative from the PM office felt that a contractor may be more
willing to co-sign the permit where the contractor had more inputs into the equipment and
processes to be used. (Bushman, 1996)
The interview with Amy Smithson (1996) ofthe Henry J. Stimson Center echoed the
concerns of the contracting officer. Ms. Smithson advised that the public interest groups
were ever watchful ofthe performance ofthe contractors in this program and would see any
changes in the processes as a threat to their understanding ofwhat had been promised to be
performed. The internal and external releases of chemical agent at the JACADS facility has
eroded their confidence that the program can be performed safely using the incineration
process. Although, the Army has made some strides in its public relations efforts, it is
important that continued efforts are made to communicate the program objectives, provide
rebuttals to claims and accusations, comply with emission standards, and maintain destruction
schedules at Tooele. Ifchanges to the program specifications are made without making that
know to the public, it is likely that program delays will continue due to inability to obtain
required EPA permits. (Smithson, 1996)
D. CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE MEASURE AND CONTRACT TYPE
The final area covered by the survey and interviews was issues regarding the possible
affect on contract type and contractor performance measurers due to conversion of current
requirements to performance specifications. The COE did not provide any input in this area,
nor did AMC, DA, or DoD, although they were in agreement that the general process used
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to review the specifications for conversion candidates and the use ofthe AMC templates to
scrub requirements was having an overall effect ofimproving the quality ofthe solicitations
being issued.
The Army SIE, Dr. Kenneth Oscar (1995), stated that as the Army changes to
performance specifications it can obtain the latest technology and this will allow the
modernization of systems and processes. The SIE also believed that the process of reviews
and scrubs was causing organizations to move away from the traditional functional way of
doing things. It was forcing the structure to change to use of integrated product teams and
focusing on performance outcomes desired in lieu ofprescribing the product in minute detail.
Anecdotal evidence provided by Dr. Oscar indicates that savings in the area of $25 million
will be reaped as a result of switching to a single soldering process at Raytheon. This
represents a significant amount to already constrained defense budgets. Properly executed,
there is reason to believe that other programs can benefit from the conversion to commercial
and performance specifications. (Oscar, 1995)
The CSDP PM office representative predicted that the move toward use of
performance specifications would allow more fixed- price arrangements in the contracts being
awarded for the program Indications are that future contractor performance evaluation plans
can be based more on the outcomes ofthe contractor's activities and not measured as much
by the old quality assurance standards that have been used in the past. In lieu ofmonitoring
and measuring each individual task in the process, the ultimate result from the process would
be considered during the award fee evaluation. This has a subsidiary benefit to the ACO of
the ability to utilize staffmembers more effectively. (Bushman, 1996)
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The contracting officer believed that changing to performance specifications should
allow the Government to go to completion type contracts. Presently the contracts are term
type contracts. Current solicitations contemplate contracts that are fixed-price for the
construction phase and cost for systemization and operations. Use of performance
specifications may allow movement to fixed-price-incentive type arrangement for some ofthe
other phases. The contracting officer would like to have the ability to tell the contractor....
"here is the plant and equipment....you (the contractor) complete munitions destruction by
'X' date." (Loehri, 1996)
As the PM drives toward more completion type incentive contracts for the
systemization, operations, and close-down phases due to changes to commercial and
performance specifications, the contracting office predicts there will be increased emphasis
on cost and schedule. The contracting office is concerned that one ofthe dangers ofthis shift
in balance is that it may decrease the emphasis on environment and safety. As more "how to"
is eliminated and more "performance" is introduced, there is a commensurate amount of
discretion left to the contractor. This increase in risk is hard to quantify and must be offset
during the source selection process by ensuring choice of a good contractor. The offsetting
benefit to use ofperformance specifications is that it allows the responses to the solicitations
to use newer and more technologically advanced ways ofproposing how they will accomplish
the requirements. This will give the source selection board the opportunity to evaluate
proposals on a "best value" basis. (Loehrl, 1996)
The current contracts in place at JACADS and Tooele have performance evaluation
plans in place that require performance monitors from the ACO office to oversee the daily
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operations and collect data on how the contractor performed a specific task. The
requirements currently in solicitation, source selection, and negotiation stages will have
performance evaluation plan factors that will look at what the outcomes ofthe contractor's
performance was in lieu of how the contractor performed the task. As more of the
contractual phases are converted to completion type, fixed-price arrangements, the
contracting officer sees that more emphasis will be based on end result performance when the
award fee board establishes the criteria for award of incentive or award fees. (Loehrl, 1996)
E. SUMMARY
In this chapter the results of the survey and information obtained during personal
interviews were set forth for each ofthe subsidiary areas of research. The processes used by
each of the primary offices involved in conversion of solicitation requirements from unique
military specifications to performance and commercial specifications was discussed. These
offices had initial reviews to comply with the DoD specification policy when it was issued and
have adopted continuing review processes to garner added benefits from the conversions to
commercial and performance specification.
In the second section ofthe chapter, the information received from the primary review
offices on cost and schedule impacts resulting from the specification review efforts was
discussed. Possible affects to the program's EPA permitting requirements and potential
program delays that may result when the current specifications are converted to performance
specifications was discussed in the third section. There is divergent opinion concerning the
EPA permitting arena. Opinion ranges from little to much concern regarding the relationship
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between the conversion of specifications and the potential for EPA involvement due to the
RCRA permit process.
The final section ofthis chapter discussed how the various offices concerned with the
CSDP believe that contract type and contractor performance evaluation measurement may
change as a result ofthe specification conversion efforts. The following chapter will provide




Information gathered through review of the available literature and interview of
individuals involved in the CSDP and acquisition reform was recorded in the previous
chapter. Most ofthe interviews included personnel opinion and anecdotal evidence on the
areas ofrelevant concern as well as factual information on the processes and known impacts
to the chemical demilitarization program Many of the information sources interviewed
qualified their remarks by indicating that it was too early in the conversion process to evaluate
the mil program impact and potential savings that may be ultimately realized from conversion
ofmilitary-unique specifications and standards to commercial or performance specifications.
This chapter will set forth an analysis ofthe information obtained. Each subsidiary research
question will be addressed in the order presented in the first chapter ofthis thesis.
A. CRITICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE CSDP
Subsidiary question one asks, "What is the nature and extent ofthe CSDP and what
are the critical issues associated with it?" The nature and extent ofthe CSDP as portrayed
by the available literature, papers, and reports on the program are discussed in Chapter II of
this thesis. The information obtained from the literature and the interviews indicate that the
major issue of the CSDP could be stated as a program objective. That objective could be
communicated as follows. To safely dispose ofstockpiled deteriorating unitary chemical
weapons within programmed life cycle cost by December 31, 2004.
Issues that could be considered ancillary to the CSDP program objective as stated
above are those of the mechanics involved in attaining that objective. A review of the
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information obtained during the research of this question indicates that the critical issues
associated with attaining the program objective are (1) obtaining the required EPA permits
to construct and operate the chemical demilitarization facilities, (2) containing the cost ofthe
program, and (3) completing the demilitarization within the mandated time. These three
issues have formed the basis for the critical program decisions and are interrelated. Delay in
receipt ofpermits and complying with unforeseen EPA requirements has caused cost growth
and endangered program completion schedules.
Another important issue that influences issuance ofthe EPA permits is the Army's
selection of baseline incineration as the disposal technology. This issue was referred to in
several interviews. The author of this thesis chose not to include the controversy over the
alternate technology issue as it is arguably unrelated to the military-unique specification and
standards reform efforts. The baseline incineration process was developed by the Army at the
CAMDS facility in Utah. Facility design is based on this process and baseline incineration is
identified in the solicitations as the only acceptable technology for the disposal process. At
this point the decision has been not to question whether the baseline incineration process
should be considered a mihtary-unique specification and the questions surrounding the issue
of alternate technologies are considered to be outside the scope of this thesis.
B. THE CONVERSION PROCESS
The second subsidiary question asks, "What are the activities necessary to convert
current specifications to predominantly performance specifications?" The responses from the
activities responsible for preparation ofthe solicitation requirements, issuance and evaluation
of the solicitations, and oversight ofthe contracting process indicate that several processes
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are being used to convert military-unique specifications to commercial or performance
specifications. The critical reviews for specification conversion candidates are performed by
the COE, the CSDP PM, and the IOC contracting offices. Analysis ofthe processes used by
these offices show that although each office described its process differently, they all used a
logic flow methodology in their review of acquisition requirement packages. The
requirements package review process used by these offices can be diagramed in a decision
tree format as set forth in Figure 4.
The decision tree begins with the identification of a military specification or standard
in the requirements documents that will become a part of a solicitation. The list of those
military specifications and standards that are exempt from the conversion policy requirement
is then consulted. Ifthe referenced specification or standard is on the fist, then the need for
the referenced specification or standard is questioned. If there is not a valid need for the
referenced document, it should be deleted; if there is a valid need for the specification or
standard, it remains with no further action. Ifthe military specification or standard is not on
the exempt list, the document must be screened to determine if it contains performance
requirements that pertain to the CSDP. If the answer is no, then the question of critical
lessons learned must be asked. Ifthe document contains critical lessons learned for the CSDP
then it should be referenced as a guideline. If it does not contain critical lessons learned it can
be deleted. Ifthe identified specification or standard contains requirements that pertain to the
CSDP then the questions "Can it be stated in the SOW?", "Does an equivalent commercial
specification or standard exist?", and "Can a performance specification be developed?" must




























Figure 4. Specification/Standard (Spec/Std) Review Decision Tree
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1. Corps of Engineers Review Process
The COE's primary responsibility is providing the facility design construction package
to be included in the solicitation for each of the site's total package contracts. The COE
acknowledged that they had not conducted a review ofthe chemical destruction facility design
package and it would be unlikely to do so. The evidence contained in the interviews indicate
that there are four reasons for not performing a review ofthe facility design package. The
fundamental rationale for not conducting a review is the fact that construction packages
primarily use performance specifications and commercial standards. Another reason for
bypassing the review was that the facility design package had been contracted and completed
prior to the current specification and standard reform effort. A third reason is that review is
precluded due to the safety considerations. The Parson facility design contract has
configuration control requirements in place to ensure that all faculties are constructed alike
to comply with current mandates. If there are any changes to the baseline design, an
engineering change proposal must be prepared and processed to ensure that no safety
parameters are jeopardized. The final reason for not performing the design package review
appears to be that resources required to perform the review have not been made available.
Although the COE is not involved in a dedicated design package review, the
interviews and surveys reveal that the Huntsville COE office has in place a mechanism to
accomplish an in-depth review ofCSDP procurement requirement packages. The interview
responses describe a constructibility team of experts. This team oftechnical, engineering,
and functional area experts do, in fact, perform reviews ofCSDP procurement requirement
packages using the logic flow as indicated in Figure 4.
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2. Program Manager's Review Process
The program office for the CSDP has primary responsible for the specification and
standard review of all the requirement documents with the exception of the construction
design package. As was noted above, the COE has responsibility for construction design.
The PM's office has used several mechanisms to perform reviews ofprocurement package
requirements. These mechanisms have included both temporary and permanent organizational
structures to address the acquisition reform initiative for specification reform A temporary
team was established to address the Secretary ofDefense memorandum dated June 29, 1994.
A permanent team has been established to conduct monthly reviews of certain portions ofthe
contractual requirements. Finally, a temporary IPT was formed for the purpose ofexamining
methods for achieving cost reductions, a portion of which includes further reviews of
contractual requirements including specifications and standards.
All of the endeavors by the PM's office to address the DoD specification and
standards acquisition reform initiative have been addressed by use of the technical and
functional expert team concept. The teams are composed ofresources from the PM's office
and other relevant organizations including external organizations to the DoD. Offices within
the DoD but external to the PM office that are routinely asked to participate on the PM's
specifications and standards review teams include the IOC contracting office and the
Huntsville COE office. During the review process the applicable contractor may become
involved in the coordination process to the extent that information is needed on safety, health,
cost, and schedule considerations that require evaluation prior to finalizing a recommendation.
External coordination with the EPA becomes necessary when permit requirements may be
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impacted by a change to the current requirement on which a RCRA permit may be based.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health
Agency may also become involved if any recommended changes to specifications and
standards would affect the safety and health standards currently established by the programs
awarded contracts. The decision tree process set forth at Figure 4 is the logic used by the
CSDP PM's teams to execute the decision making support documentation and determine
what recommendation will be made to the final decision authority. The review team(s)
coordination requirements may be illustrated by the network diagram at Figure 5.
Figure 5. Specification Review Team Coordination Network
3. Contracting Office's Review Process
The IOC contracting office has adapted its solicitation review processes to include
a review for mihtary-unique specifications and standards. There are two major reviews
performed during the solicitation preparation cycle at the contracting office that include
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military-unique specifications and standards. These reviews are the RFP scrub, when the
AMC templates are applied, and the solicitation review board to obtain the necessary
clearance to issue the solicitation.
The RFP scrub and the solicitation review board are reviews directed by the internal
contracting procedures for the subordinate buying activities under the AMC. The purpose
ofthese reviews is to eliminate any unnecessary requirement that does not provide value to
the supplies and services being procured or does not provide critical information to enable the
effective and efficient administration and oversight ofthe contractual arrangement. The RFP
scrub is not limited to seeking out any reference to military specifications and standards, but
includes a complete review of the four corners of the solicitation and a questioning of any
requirement that appears to be excessive or superfluous to the instant procurement. The PM
and the COE is invited to participate in RFP scrubs as they must ultimately coordinate on any
recommended changes to requirement documents including the SOW and CDRL.
The solicitation review board is concerned with ensuring that the document proposed
for issuance is legally sufficient and that all the required legal and regulatory approvals,
determinations and finds, or other required documentation has been received and in the pre-
award file. This review represents the final opportunity to identify any military specification
or standard that was not identified and addressed in previous reviews prior to the solicitation
being issued. Requiring activities are normally invited to participate in these reviews to
answer any board members' questions relating to the requirement documents.
The contracting office may become involved in additional military specification and
standard reviews after the solicitation is issued. Additional reviews are encouraged by
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including an invitation in the solicitations and contracts for the potential and the actual
contractors to recommend alternative specifications and standards to those called out in the
RFP or contract. If an alternate proposal is received during the evaluation phase it can be
coordinated and negotiated during the source selection and negotiation process. If an
alternate suggestion for use of commercial or performance specifications is received after
contract award, the proposal could be treated as a value engineering change proposal,
coordinated in accordance with those procedures, negotiated, and incorporated into the
contract by a modification.
It is apparent that the contracting office is using a logic decision tree process as is set
forth at Figure 4 for specification and standard reviews relating to solicitation requirements.
For any change proposals received after solicitation and prior to award, the source selection
and negotiation process would be the vehicle used for coordination and accomplishing the
change. After contract award, contractor submitted specification and standard change
requests will likely take the form of value engineering change proposals and be processed
through that established procedure.
4. Other Levels of Review Process
In any pre-solicitation review, when major changes in specifications or standards are
made that could have critical effects on the program risks (i.e., cost, schedule, and/or
performance) or constitutes a change in the approved program acquisition strategy , the MDA
may need to approve the change and the solicitation release. The AMC, ASARDA, and the
DAB may become involved in changes recommended by reviews involving conversion of
military specifications and standards to performance or commercial specifications. The funds
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already invested in the training facility at Aberdeen Proving Grounds were the basis for the
recommendation for the MDA to approve a waiver for the training specification. It is unlikely
that the levels ofreview above the IOC contracting office and the CSDP PM office will use
the decision tree approach in their reviews of this program's requirements. Although it
should be anticipated that any in-process review ofthe CSDP at the HQDA and DoD level
may question whether the DoD memorandum on specifications and standards has been
considered and complied with during preparation ofthe solicitation documents.
Ifchanges in specifications and standards are proposed by contractors after award of
the contract, it is unlikely that the headquarters activities ofthe Army or DoD will become
involved. Approval actions at the MDA level are only required if a non-exempt military
specification or standard is being proposed for use in a solicitation.
Therefore, it is appropriate that there was no indication at these levels that a
disciplined review process, such as the process illustrated by Figure 4, is used for specification
and standard reviews or that such reviews are even needed. The ACAT ID program review
process is sufficient to ensure that the DoD policy on maximization of performance and
commercial specifications is considered and implemented by the PM and contracting office.
The ensuing section will provide an analysis ofthe potential schedule and cost impacts
due to conversions to use ofperformance and commercial specification for the CSDP.
C. SCHEDULE AND COST IMPACT ANALYSIS
The question, "What is the affect on schedules and cost to accomplish this conversion
process?" is asked by the third subsidiary question. This section will first provide an analysis
of the information received regarding schedule impacts. Then an examination of the costs
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reported as of January 1996 and projected costs of potential future reviews to convert
remaining military specifications and standards to commercial or performance specifications
will be supplied.
1. Schedule Impact
None ofthe primary review offices, Huntsville COE, CSDP PM, or IOC contracting,
were able to attribute any schedule delays to the reviews conducted to convert military
specifications and standards to commercial or performance specifications. When the DoD
memorandum was issued in June 1994, the Tooele facility total package contract had been
awarded and the Anniston facility solicitation had been issued. The Anniston facility
solicitation was issued in April 1992. At the time ofthe DoD memorandum on specifications
and standards, the Anniston RFP was still open with a projected award date of October 1994.
None ofthe remaining solicitations for demilitarization faculties were scheduled or ready for
issuance in June 1994. The military specifications and standards review was required only for
the procurement requirements to be issued with new solicitations.
The PM's office solicitation requirements review resulting from the June 1994 DoD
memorandum included all procurement packages that were being prepared for RFPs. After
experiencing numerous extensions to the closing date for the Anniston facility solicitation, due
to EPA permit delays, the PM requested that the contracting officer issue amendments to that
RFP to accomplish military specification and standard conversions. As a result of this
decision, it is likely that there will be some savings accrue to the program due to the
conversion to performance and commercial specifications as early in the process as possible.
From the information received regarding schedule impacts, the changes to the RFP to convert
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military specifications and standards to performance or commercial specifications were not
the underlying reason for delay ofaward ofthe Anniston facility total package contract. The
award was made on February 29, 1996, with a limited authority to proceed due to lack of an
EPA permit that would allow construction to begin. That permit is expected in June 1996.
As is indicated by the above discussion, there is little evidence to associate the CSDP
schedule delays with the acquisition reform direction to convert military specifications and
standards to commercial or performance specifications. Although individual solicitation
amendments incorporating specification and standard changes may have extended the closing
date for the Anniston RFP, the EPA permitting process was the overriding delaying factor in
the ultimate award date of the contract. Review ofthe CSDP schedule at Figure 3 indicates
that ifcontinued program schedule slippages are experienced due to EPA permitting delays,
completion of disposal by the mandated date is at risk.
2. Cost Impact
The PM, COE, and IOC offices incurred cost because of the acquisition reform
initiative to maximize usage of commercial and performance specifications. The IOC
contracting office cost for the initial military specification and standard review, chaired by the
PM office, was included in the estimate provided by the PM's representative. The contracting
office's standing operation procedures require performance of the RFP scrub to apply the
AMC templates and the solicitation review prior to issuing the RFP. As these reviews would
have been performed whether or not the review to eliminate unneeded military specifications
and standards was performed, those costs were not estimated or attributed to the cost impact
ofthis acquisition reform. This section will discuss the estimated cost impact to the PM and
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the COE offices as well as the potential savings that may be expected as a result of conversion
to commercial and performance specifications.
Data were not available from any ofthe offices on the specific personnel, grade levels,
or functional areas represented by the review teams. Several assumptions were necessary to
perform the analysis of personnel cost. First, it was assumed that multiple function areas
would need to be represented with a mix of grade levels commensurate with the level of
expertise required to perform the necessary analysis. An average grade level of General
Schedule (GS) 12, step 5 was used by the researcher based on the professional level of skill
required to make the recommendations set forth in the decision tree portrayed at Figure 4.
An 18 percent benefit level was assumed based on the recommendation of an Army salary and
compensation budget analyst at an AMC subordinate activity. The annual compensation
amount was assumed to be based on 2,087 hours for a full-time equivalent employee. Using
these assumptions to estimate personnel cost for full-time equivalent employees, Tables 6 and
7 were constructed for use in this analysis. Table 6 displays the GS compensation for the
Huntsville, Washington D.C./Baltimore, Rest ofthe U.S. and Base Pay (without locality pay
adjustment) as of January 1994 for grade level 12, step 5 full-time equivalent employees.
Table 7 displays the GS-12, step 5 compensation for the same geographical areas as of
January 1995. The four regional categories in the tables represent the geographic locations
of the offices involved in the reviews with the base pay region which pertains to all
geographical areas for which GS compensation is utilized. The base pay category indicates
the basis of compensation without locality pay adjustments. The rates of compensation for
1994 and 1995 were calculated by using the pay rates and the locality percentage increases
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Region Annual Salary Hourly Rate Benefits 18% Adjusted Rate
Base Pay $45,670 $21.88 $3.94 $25.82
Huntsville 47,542 22.78 4.10 26.88
Rest ofthe U.S. 47,081 22.56 4.06 26.62
Washington/Baltimore 47,602 22.81 4.11 26.92
Table 6. GS-12/5 Compensation Rates as of January 1994 (Mace & Yoder, 1995)
Region Annual Salary Hourly Rate Benefits 18% Adjusted Rate
Base Pay $46,584 $22.32 $4.02 $26.34
Huntsville 48,629 23.30 4.19 27.49
Rest ofthe U.S. 48,326 23.16 4.17 27.33
Washington/Baltimore 49,137 23.54 4.24 27.78
Table 7. GS/5 Compensation Rates as of January 1995 (Mace & Yoder, 1995)
for GS employees published in the Federal Employees Almanac, 1995 Edition. The
percentage that salaries increased for Huntsville, Rest ofthe U.S., and Washington/Baltimore
were as indicated in Table 8. Rates reflected in the adjusted rate column represents the
amount that will be used to calculate the estimated costs ofperforming the necessary reviews
Region 1994 1995
Huntsville 4.10 2.28
Rest of the U.S. 3.09 2.64
Washington/Baltimore 4.23 3.22
Table 8. Yearly Salary Increases in Percent (Mace & Yoder, 1995)
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and related tasks to convert military specifications and standards to commercial or
performance specifications.
The Huntsville COE estimated the cost to review one solicitation's construction
design package to be about $250,000. The exact breakdown of the categories of costs
included in that number was not made available to the researcher. The one available statistic
was that approximately 3,000 hours ofpersonnel resources would be expended to perform
the review. Using Tables 6 and 7 the cost of human resources would equate to $80,640
($26.88 X 3,000) if the review was performed in 1994 and $82,470 ($27.49 X 3,000) if
performed in 1995. The Tooele and Anniston solicitation had been issued when the DoD
directive was issued. Therefore there will be no costs incurred for those solicitations. The
Umatilla solicitation was issued on July 8, 1994, prior to receipt by the contracting office of
the June 29, 1994, Secretary ofDefense memorandum. As this solicitation had been issued
prior to receipt of the DoD policy statement, no review of the design specification was
performed for the purpose of identifying or converting military specifications and standards
in the design package to commercial or performance specifications. The Pine Bluff
solicitation was issued prior to the 180 day period allowed for waiver ofthe implementation
of the changes directed by the DoD memorandum. No design review on the facility design
was performed prior to issuance ofthe Pine Bluff solicitation. As of January 1996, the COE
has not performed a presolicitation design review ofthe CSDP requirements.
There are four solicitations remaining to be issued for demilitarization facilities.
Design requirements reviews for those solicitation packages will be required unless a waiver
is granted by the MDA or the DAB. The COE has advised that the estimated amount of
87
$250,000 per solicitation package review would still apply. Thus it can be expected that the
cost of presolicitation design package reviews will be about $1 million. The personnel
resource cost of those reviews could be less that $400,000 based on the calculation made
using the assumptions stated above.
The cost ofon-going reviews and the continuous monitoring performed by the COE
was stated as a 1.5 year full-time equivalent effort. Using the adjusted rate for Huntsville
from Table 6 and Table 7 the costs can be estimated as follows:
1994 Adjusted Rate times 0.75 years effort = $26.88 x 1,565.3 hours = $ 42,075
1995 Adjusted Rate times 1.50 years effort = $27.49 x 3,130.5 hours = $ 86,057
Personnel Cost for 1994 and 1995 COE On-going Reviews = $128,132
Using the national raise amount of 2.4 percent, the 1996 GS-12, step 5 rate for Huntsville is
calculated to be approximately $28. 15. If another 1.5 years of effort is expended for 1996,
the cost would be approximately $88,124 ($28.15 times 3,130.5 hours). From these data
points, the conclusion can be made that the on-going cost to the COE for monitoring the
specifications and standards would be less than $ 100,000 annually. .
Cost incurred by the PM office for reviews of the solicitation requirements can be
calculated by using the Washington/Baltimore adjusted rate times the estimated number of
hours to perform the review. The initial review was performed in 1994, therefore the adjusted
rate of $26.92 was used. This review included personnel from the Huntsville COE and the
IOC contracting offices. The Rest of the U.S. salary rates apply to IOC contracting office
personnel. No attempt was made to isolate these personnel costs as cost oftemporary duty
would more than offset the salary differences. Based on the assumptions used for this study
the estimated personnel cost ofthe PM initial review would be $20, 190 ($26.92 x 750 hours).
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On-going reviews by the PM office are primarily performed by personnel located at
the PM office at Aberdeen Proving Ground. The on-going review costs were calculated as
follows. For the continuing "how to" reviews the Washington/Baltimore Adjusted Rate was
used. The rate was applied to five months effort in 1994 and 12 months effort in 1995. This
calculation resulted in the following personnel cost estimate for "how to" reviews:
1994 Adjusted Rate times five months effort = $26.92 x 500 hours = $13,460.
1995 Adjusted Rate times 12 months effort = $27.78 x 1,200 hours = $33,336.
Personnel Cost for 1994 and 1995 PM "How To" Reviews = $46,796.
A 1996 rate of $28.45 applies to the Washington/Baltimore area using the 2.4 percent
national raise. Ifthe PM continues to use 100 hours a month for the "how to" review, the
cost of the effort would be about $34,140 ($28.45 times 1,200 hours).
The second type ofon-going reviews being performed by the PM office is the CDRL
reduction and commercial equipment conversion reviews. Using the same assumptions for
adjusted rates for the Washington/Baltimore region with an estimated average of450 hours
per month review time, the following personnel costs were calculated:
1994 Adjusted Rate times 5 months effort = $26.92 x 2,250 hours = $ 60,570.
1995 Adjusted Rate time 12 months effort = $27.78 x 5,400 hours = $150,012.
Personnel Cost for 1994 and 1995 PM CDRL and Equipment Reviews = $210,582.
Projecting the cost for 1996, using the same assumptions as the "how to" review, would
estimate the personnel cost for continuing these reviews at $153,630 ($28.45 times 5,400
hours).
The information received from the PM indicates significant conversion of unique
military specified GFE to commercial equipment. Estimates of cost avoidance provided by
the U. S. Army Competition Advocate General when commercially available equipment is
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procured in lieu of military unique equipment range from 10 to 20 percent. The current
estimate of$15 million ofcommercial equipment that has now been identified for competition
can be expected to provide from $1.5 to $3 million of cost avoidance per new site. As the
equipment for the Tooele and Anniston sites had been procured at the time ofthis study, the
cost avoidance prediction may be applied to the remaining six sites. From these calculations,
it is possible to estimate projected cost avoidance offrom $9 to $18 million.
The following section will provide an analysis ofthe information received regarding
the potential affects that conversion of specifications and standards to commercial or
performance on the EPA permitting process for the CSDP.
D. EPA PERMIT PROCESS ANALYSIS
The fourth subsidiary question asks, "What are the potential affects ofthe conversion
process on EPA approvals and certification requirements?" The delay to the CSDP due to
the requirement to obtain EPA permits for construction and operation ofthe demilitarization
facilities has been documented throughout this research effort. In addition to obtaining
information and opinions on this area of potential impacts from the Government offices
involved in the program, a not-for-profit institution that is concerned with the progress ofthe
disposal ofthese lethal weapons was asked to comment. The analysis oftheir comments is
provided below.
The PM and COE representatives that responded to this question were the most
optimistic about mitigation ofpermit delays. Both offices felt that ifthe reviews addressed
the risks involved in the program and ensured that the current quality assurance levels and
performance parameters were not altered, the EPA permits and the ability to obtain them
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should not be affected. These offices agreed that ifthe quality or safety levels contained in
the RCRA application are not altered by changes in the specifications and standards, there
would not be a requirement to submit documentation to the EPA for an amended permit.
The contracting office and the representative from the not-for-profit organization were
less optimistic about potential delays. The concerns voiced by these organizations were based
on the past history ofpublic interest groups. There is a distinct possibility of delay when
concerned citizens and other interest groups obtain information on changes to the CSDP.
When these entities do not understand the reason for the change or cannot interpret the data
in a manner that would allay their fears regarding the health and environmental issues
surrounding the program, objections to the changes will be lodged. The need to keep the
public informed appears to be a fundamental premise that must be adhered to in this program
to blunt the impact ofpublic interest groups' influence on the EPA process.
The information received in this area is of the nature that only speculation on the
possible impacts can be made. When the current program schedule at Figure 3 is examined,
it is evident that any additional program delays will cause the demilitarization process to
exceed the current mandated completion schedule. As no RCRA permit changes have been
requested or required as a result of conversions that have already been accomplished, the
program schedule impact cannot be predicted at this time. However the CSDP PM must
weigh the risks of changes that affect safety and quality levels carefully if schedule impacts
are to be avoided.
The final question ofthis research regarding contract type and measuring contractor
performance is addressed in the next section ofthis chapter.
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E. CONTRACT TYPE AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The final area of this research asked two questions. One question was, 'To what
extent will contract type for the CSDP be affected by predominant use of performance
specifications?" The second question asked, "What measurement techniques could be used
to evaluate contractor performance?"
The COE is the ACO for the construction phase of the contracts and chose not to
provide input in this area. The following discussion is the researcher's reasoning for the COE
declination to comment in this area. For the construction requirements, the COE considers
the specifications to be performance oriented and primarily based on commercial
specifications and standards. It was also noted that for the Anniston, Umatilla, and Pine Bluff
solicitations the construction phases are contemplated to be firm-fixed-price line items. There
is no reason to believe at this time that the future solicitations will not use firm-fixed-price for
the construction phase. Use of firm-fixed-price for this phase means that an award fee plan
for construction will not be required and the COE will accept or reject work under this phase
ofthe program in accordance with well established COE procedures and processes.
An important issue that needs to be addressed is the expectation that the COE will
utilize its partnering concept for these contracts. Use ofpartnering in these contracts would
open communication channels and lessen the adversarial relationships that have historically
been prevalent in the contract administration arena.
Ifthe COE proposes use oftheir partnering concept and it is successful in convincing
the contractors to participate in the process, improved outcomes can be expected. Some
areas ofimprovement that may be expected include those listed below.
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• Reduced cost growth.
• Fewer claims and litigation.
• Accident rate reduction.
• Encouragement of contract suggestions to change the requirements that can
produce cost savings and prevent future problems.
The benefits ofthe use of fixed-price contracts for construction coupled with the partnering
concept are discussed above to show that performance oriented and commercial specifications
have probably already had a positive impact on program cost.
The responses received from the contracting office and the PM office were very
optimistic about being able to convert portions ofthe contracts to some form of completion
arrangement. It is not inherently clear from the discussions with these offices that conversion
to performance and commercial specifications is the main reason that a change to a different
contract type may be expected. Although it was felt that fixed-price arrangements could be
an expected outcome to the conversion process, the PM representative proceeded to discuss
performance evaluation plans that are normally applied only to cost type contracts. The
contracting officer discussed the risk aspects ofthe performance but reserved speculation on
the degree of risk or to whom that risk would shift.
There appears to be several conflicting goals in the program that will need to be
resolved prior to addressing the type of contractual arrangement that best fits the various
phases of the program The PM sees the conversion to performance and commercial
specifications and standards as allowing more fixed-price arrangements. However, this shift
ofperformance risk to the contractor would normally be construed as one rationale for the
contractor to prefer cost type arrangements, thus mitigating possible losses due to unexpected
cost. More fiscal constraints are being placed on the program due to reduced budgets. This
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is causing the need to control cost. The program schedules are under pressure due to the
likelihood of continued delays in obtaining required permits to proceed. Fixed-price type
arrangements would provide contractual benefits of ensuring program cost stability with a
requirement for the contractor to deliver the service as scheduled. However, these benefits
would only be received ifthere are minimal program changes. The likelihood of a program
of this nature, with performance over an extended period of time, not experiencing some
significant program changes is remote.
The acquisition strategy for this program requires total system type procurement for
each ofthe demilitarization sites. This strategy means that a single contract can be expected
to be in effect from five to nine years. Each contract has multiple phases with the potential
for changes in specifications and standards in each phase. Further complicating the contract
administration is the potential that an alternate technology may be introduced and mandated
for the program. As ofMarch 1996 there are three different contractors for the three sites
where contracts have been awarded. Each site has a different mix of munitions to be
demilitarized. All ofthese factors are significant considerations when determining contract
type. In order to convert portions or phases ofthe contracts to fixed-price completion forms,
the contracting officer must include language in the contract that will allow the renegotiation
of line items or phases of contract performance. By so doing the Government can take
advantage of those areas where fixed-price arrangements can be used and move toward
utilization ofperformance based criteria for incentive or award fees.
Specific performance criteria that could be used in evaluation of contractor
performance was not provided by the contracting officer or the PM representative. The PCO
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advised that the current contracts at Johnston Atoll and Tooele are cost type contracts that
continue to rely on evaluation of how the contractor performed the task in lieu of the
outcomes of the task. The PCO also advised that contracts resulting from the current and
future solicitations will evaluate the contractor's performance in the following areas.
• Environment/Safety~(e.g., environmental compliance, personal and
operational safety.).
• Operations~(e.g., achieving required through-put rates, efficient changeover,
closure efficiency.).
• Cost/Schedule—(e.g., cost variance performance from the Cost Performance
Report, management/effectiveness in controlling and/or reducing costs,
providing timely and accurate data, meeting milestones.).
• Performance/Support~(e.g., personnel practices, property storage,
transportation, design interface, logistics, maintenance, suspense/reports,
contract management, meeting proposed and/or established goals for small
business plan.). (Loehrl, 1996)
The criteria identified above appear to be in accordance with the contract performance
requirements and coincide with the stated program hierarchy of priorities. Without the exact
statement or plan ofhow the contractor will be evaluated against these criteria, an evaluation
ofthe appropriateness ofthe criteria would not be credible.
F. SUMMARY
The analysis contained in this chapter looked at the information received from the
surveys and interviews for each of the subsidiary research questions and provided the
researcher's perspective on that material. It was recognized that those offices involved in the
military specification and standard conversion process used a similar logic that was diagramed
into a decision tree that could be used for similar efforts in this area. The process evaluation
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also disclosed that coordination between and among the offices was similar for each
organization.
The material received on cost and schedule impacts shows that the specification and
standard review process has not had an impact on overall program schedules although there
may have been some impact on individual solicitation milestones. The cost ofthe reviews was
analyzed using some basic assumptions about personnel grade levels and compensation rates.
Only personnel cost for the reviews was used as the costs for such items as temporary duty,
supplies and materials, and other overhead expenses were not available. A calculation ofthe
estimated personnel cost ofreviews for the COE and PM is summarized below.
Expended (94/95) Projected (96)
COE:
On-going ConstructibiUty Reviews $128,132 $88,124
PM:
Initial Spec/Std Review 20, 190
"How To" Reviews 46,796 34, 140
CDRL/Equipment Reviews 210.582 153.630
Totals $405.700 $275.894
The COE has estimated the cost of $1 million ifthe design package is required to be
included in future solicitation package reviews. No specific cost for specification and
standard reviews for the contracting office was identified. The reviews performed by that
office would have been required irregardless of the DoD policy on specifications and
standards. Projected savings from the equipment reviews alone were calculated to be from
$9 to $18 million.
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The analysis of the information received in response to the questions on possible
affects on the EPA permitting process shows that there is a distinct potential for further delays
if the process results in requests for changes in the RCRA application regarding safety and
quality levels. This area is speculative as no application changes have been requested at this
time. In the area of contract type and contractor performance measurement techniques, the
information received was sparse due to the speculative nature of predicting the future.
However, the analysis indicates that there is a potential for moving to completion type
contract arrangements and using more results oriented contractor performance measurement
criteria.
The final chapter ofthis thesis will provide conclusions of this research in the context
of the primary research question and make recommendations based on analysis of the
information received. The chapter concludes with areas for further research.
97
98
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis, offers recommendations, and
provides suggested areas for further research. The conclusions and recommendations are
intended to provide some insight on how acquisition reform efforts have benefited the CSDP.
It is hoped that this discussion will promote acquisition reform in other DoD programs.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this research was to determine the impact of implementing the
acquisition reform requirement to use performance specifications on the contracting effort for
the CSDP. The objective was expanded to include commercial specifications and standards
due to their integral relationship during the conversion process. From the earliest
documented acquisition reform commissions to the present, attempts have been made to bring
the DoD procurement process in alignment with commercial practices. Multiple published
reports, regulatory changes, and legislation have called for consideration of agencies to
abandon unique military specifications and standards in favor oftheir commercial equivalents
or performance statements of work. None ofthe calls for action in this arena have been as
successful as the Secretary of Defense directive issued on June 29, 1994. Although this
memorandum was never formally or officially promulgated by the DoD acquisition
regulations, the implementation ofthe policy has had far reaching influence on the acquisition
community.
The CSDP has benefited from its implementation of the direction set to convert
military unique specifications and standards to commercial or performance specifications.
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The process developed by the offices involved in the conversion endeavor is a logical decision
tree that can be applied to any program seeking to convert military specifications and
standards. The organizations involved in the reviews have successfully used this process in
areas other than the quest to eliminate unique Federal Government specifications. The PM
applied the logic ofthe review process to unique GFE, CDRL item, and "how to" language
buried within the requirements packages for the program's solicitations.
The conversion process is human resource intensive and requires an extensive
coordination effort to ensure that quality and safety are not compromised by change
recommendations. However, the equipment review alone has a potential ofproducing cost
avoidance ofup to $18 million. There is anecdotal evidence that conversions to commercial
and performance specifications, process changes resulting from the "how to" language being
replaced with "outcome expected" statements, and elimination of non-value added CDRL
items can result in substantial cost reduction and avoidance. It is intended that the conversion
efforts undertaken by the CSDP requirements developers will assist the program in meeting
its LCCE.
The impact on program schedules due to specification and standard reviews has been
minimal and has not resulted in any changes in overall program completion timetables. Some
individual solicitation milestones were adjusted to allow incorporation of changes
recommended by the review teams. However, these changes had no impact on overall
program completion schedules. There has not been a need for the CSDP PM to request
changes to the RCRA permit applications being processed for approval by the EPA as a result
ofchanging requirements to commercial and performance specifications. The lack ofthe need
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for amendments to the EPA permit applications is fortunate since any request to amend
pending applications or current permits is likely to cause delay to program schedules. The
delays experienced in obtaining EPA permits have been the major cause ofCSDP schedule
slippages. The EPA is required to ensure that the mandates for pollution controls set by
statute are enforced. During the coordination process the EPA must take into consideration
the interests ofenvironmental and other public sector organizations. The process ofhearing,
deliberating, and addressing these public interests is time consuming and often beyond the
control ofthe EPA as constituent concerns are often elevated to Congressional members. In
turn Congressional members bring pressures that delay permit issuance until constituent
concerns are addressed. The PM should expect continued program delays since the need to
address constituent concerns wall very likely exist until the last chemical weapon is destroyed.
In the future, the CSDP may be able to consider moving to more completion oriented
types of pricing arrangements for additional line items or phases of contracts awarded for
demilitarization projects. Although changes to commercial and performance specifications
may be a factor in the ability to craft these arrangements, other compelling factors also must
be resolved. One such issue is the inherent financial risk due to potential for accidents and
resulting claims or fines. Reaching agreement between the Government and the contractors
on how that risk should be shared is critical and can influence the type ofpricing arrangement
selected. Another issue is Government confidence that program changes will not be
substantial enough in the out years ofthe program to preclude a fixed-price arrangement for
certain contact line items or phases of operation.
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The conversion pursuits ofthe CSDP have positive influence on program cost with
minimal schedule repercussion. The review processes follow a logical methodology that may
be applied to multiple areas of consideration to improve the solicitation document. The
improved solicitation documents have enhanced the source selection opportunities to select
the best value alternative. An improved solicitation, with the ability to select best value
alternatives, and enhanced contract administration processes such as partnering should,
ultimately, lead to a better contractual instrument and improved contractor performance. At
the very least, these methods should furnish the framework needed for the contractor to
deliver the performance expected in a superior manner while providing the contractor and the
Government flexibility to respond rapidly to improved technology and better practices as they
are identified. The DoD policy for conversion of military specifications and standards to
performance statements and commercial equivalent specifications and standards has been
beneficial to the CSDP. Continued efforts in this area should enhance the ability to
demilitarize the deteriorating stockpile oflethal chemical weapons within projected cost while
maintaining or improving the quality and safety levels currently set by EPA permit regulators.
The following section provides recommendations intended to enhance the ability of
program participants to efficiently and effectively execute their respective areas ofthe CSDP.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The CSDP has made significant progress in the improvement ofthe management of
the chemical weapons disposal process. The following recommendations are offered as
potential areas that may assist the PM in achieving the ultimate goal ofthe program, to safely
102
dispose of lethal chemical weapons within the projected LCCE and by the mandated
completion date.
Construction Design Review : As explained in this thesis, there is reason to believe that
significant saving or cost avoidances will be achieved for the CSDP through the past and on-
going specification and standard reviews and conversion process. There is sufficient time to
thoroughly review the construction design package prior to issuance ofthe next solicitations.
The cost estimate to review that package has been set at $250,000 for each solicitation
remaining to be issued for the program Investment in a complete review of the design
package has the potential ofproviding additional saving or cost avoidance for the program.
The need for more than one review ofthe design package should be explored. Congress has
mandated that the same design should be applied for each ofthe sites. After the initial review
is completed, follow-on reviews may need only address approved changes in the design
configuration. Additionally, an evaluation ofthe estimates ofpersonnel costs for past reviews
and reviews projected for 1996 appears to be in conflict with the estimate for the design
package review. All other reviews are human resource intensive, therefore it can be
concluded that the major cost for the design package review will be for personnel. Using the
rates provided in Figure 7 for the Huntsville region adjusted for projected pay raises, the
personnel cost could likely be less than $100,000 for the estimated 3,000 hours to complete
a design package review. Cost to perform the design review may be substantially less than
expected. For the above reasons, it is believed that a specifications and standards review of
the construction design package should be pursued. This review is likely to ultimately lead
to identification ofpotential savings or cost avoidances that may be reaped in this area.
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Modification of Current Contracts: On-going reviews performed by the CSDP PM
have the possibility ofidentifying significant areas for change to benefit the cost and schedule
of the program. When these items are identified and the risk assessment does not cause
concern about changes in quality and/or safety, changes to current contracts should be
pursued. The PM should also consider requesting the contracting office to solicit changes
from the current operating contractors to enhance performance while providing opportunities
for cost and schedule efficiencies. These change recommendations need not be limited to
conversion ofmilitary specifications and standards to performance or commercial standards.
They also should include the areas of continuing review being performed by the CSDP
organizational elements.
Partnering Concept: The partnering concept used by the COE in many of its
construction projects has proven to accrue cost and schedule benefits. The process has been
highly touted by the GAO and has been widely adopted by many recognized highly efficient
and effective private sector companies. By adopting this concept throughout the life ofthe
total systems contract for each facility site, significant cost and time savings may be expected.
The following quote ofLTG A.E. Williams, Commander, U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers, in
Policy Memorandum 4, dated March 31, 1993, indicates the rationale for using the partnering
concept:
Because partnering develops positive and mutually beneficial relationships, it
creates a climate characterized by trust and cooperation. It creates a
relationship between two or more parties and promotes teamwork. Partnering
seeks to eliminate the 'us' versus 'them' mentality, and to form a 'we'
approach for the mutual benefit of the project user, the taxpayers, and the
contractor.
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Contracting Office RFP Scrubs: These reviews ofthe solicitation requirements have
proved to be beneficial in elimination ofunneeded and redundant requirements that add cost
to contract performance. However, it is believed that the inclusion of searches for military
unique specifications and standards in these reviews is redundant and could be eliminated
from the RFP scrub procedure. The PM performs a requirements package review prior to the
contracting office RFP scrub. When the PM provides requirements for inclusion in the
planned solicitation, all actions to use or convert military specifications and standards should
have been accomplished. The PM certification that the review, in accordance with the DoD
direction, has been completed and any waivers needed have been obtained should suffice for
the contracting file documentation. Further reviews appear to add unnecessary administrative
burden and cost to the solicitation process.
Public Relations: When opportunities arise to inform and educate the public about
the CSDP and the initiatives being implemented, such opportunities should be used to
publicize the specification and standard conversion process. Taking the initiative to advise
community and environmental groups of the process and the risk assessments that are
continuously made to ensure that quality and safety standards are maintained or exceeded will
send more positive signals to these interest groups. These groups have historically been
suspicious of Army motives and have continuously kept the PM on the defensive in
responding to their concerns. If the Army takes a more positive and proactive position in
iriforming the public what is being changed and considerations for quality and safety built into
the process, some credibility may be regained. Should future changes to the EPA permit
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applications be required, there is a possibility for less controversy and delay in obtaining an
amendment ifthe public and interest groups have been better informed.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This research focused on the impact of specification and standard acquisition reform
on the CSDP. During the research ofthis topic, several other issues were identified where
further research might be ofvalue. These areas ofpotential research include the following:
1. Contractor Opportunities to Participate in the Process . Research in this area could
include the degree that contractors are taking advantage of the opportunities to purpose
commercial standards and performance statements in solicitations and for existing contracts.
The private sector has been lobbying for a number ofyears for use ofperformance statements
and commercial specifications and standards. The degree ofresponse to the DoD initiative
in this area would provide insight on how serious defense contractors are about these
conversions and the benefits or pitfalls they foresee in pursuing these changes. As there were
several source selections in process at the time of this research, very little information was
obtainable on how the contractors believed they would benefit from the conversion for the
CSDP. Research in this area could assist the PM in deterrnining projected program benefits
as reflected in reduced costs or performance schedules.
2. Effect of Military Specification and Standard Conversion on Contract
Administration Specifically, research into this subject would address how the performance
measures utilized for award fee or incentive fee purposes change as the result of using
performance and commercial specifications and standards. The area of potential staff
reductions to monitor performance could be included in this research effort as well as the
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change in Government and contractor relationships that may result when performance
measures change.
3. Shifting ofRisk. As less "how to" and more commercial practices and standards,
fewer reporting requirements, and more commercial equipment are introduced in the CSDP
there should be some degree of shifting of risk to the parties ofthe contract. Assessment of
the risk involved in the conversions and where that risk would be lodged was beyond the
scope ofthis study. With the inherent risks ofthe CSDP such an analysis would be beneficial
to the PM, the EPA, the contractors, and interest groups. It would also serve to assess the
plausibility of making certain changes if other critical program elements are adversely
affected.
4. Total Package Contracting. There are continuing arguments among procurement
professionals on the advisability of using total package procurement for programs that are
subject to change due to controversy or of long duration. The unpredictable nature of
programs that contain these elements usually tends to cause preference for shorter term, well
defined contracting arrangements. The CSDP has tried both approaches for the site facility
and operations contracts. A study ofthe benefits and shortcomings ofusing total package
contracting for the CSDP may be helpful in planning of future acquisition strategy in
programs of similar nature.
5. Obtaining EPA Permits. The process of obtaining EPA permits has been especially
arduous for the CSDP. Research in this area may be able to sort out the obstacles that need
to be overcome. This controversial program has more than its share of objections with the
EPA permitting process. Other programs might be able to use the lessons learned by the
107
CSDP, especially in the area of prediction of performance schedules based on receipt of
required permits. Areas ofresearch could include the time needed or that should be allowed
in programs to obtain the permits, types of assistance the PM can give the EPA to expedite
the process, and the nature ofeducation necessary to assure the public that permits should be
granted.
6. Public Tnfluence on Defense Programs Involvement ofpublic interest groups in
the CSDP has resulted in EPA permit delays and adversarial relationships between DoD and
private sector interests. A look into the basis for these inimical positions and ways that they
might be overcome or avoided in the future could be of great value to DoD for other
programs that face contentious issues and diverse opinions on the appropriate methods for
resolving matters ofhigh public concern.
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Assistant Secretary ofthe Army (Installations, Logistics, and
Environment)
Army Systems Acquisition Review Council
Assistant Secretary ofthe Army (Research, Development, and
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Milestone Decision Authority
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Primary : What impact will the acquisition reform requirement to use
performance specifications have on the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
(CSDP) contracting efforts?
Subsidiary Question 1 : What are the nature and extent of the CSDP and what are
the critical issues associated with it?
Interview Questions
1. What are the characteristics of this program that make it unique as an ACAT ID
program?
2. What measures are critical to ensure program success? (Cost, Schedule, Safety,
Environmental Compliance, Disposal Methods, Treaty Compliance)
3. What Governmental Agencies are involved in the program? Please include












c. Private Public Interest Groups
4. How do the offices listed in question four influence the program?
5. Which public interest groups are interested in the CSDP? What are their specific
agendas and how do they influence the program?
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Subsidiary Question 2 : What are the activities necessary to convert current
specifications to predominantly performance specifications?
Interview Questions :
1. What Government activities or offices are involved in the specification
conversion effort?
2. Is there a formal structure (PAT, IPT) in place to review the CSDP
specifications? If so what is its structure? Ifthere is an informal structure, what is it?
3. Which offices or activities will need to coordinate the purposed changes to the
specifications? Can you provide names ofthe activities and their level of authority.
4. Will the specification review for all phases ofperformance in the solicitation or
contract be performed by a single office? If so identify that office. Ifnot, identify the





e. Operations, Chemical Destruction
f. Operations, Maintenance
g. Close Down
5. Has a standard process been established to review the solicitation requirement
document, identify the military specifications and standards, and determine the action
required? If so, what is the process? Ifnot, how will the review be performed?
6. Will current operating contractors or offerors on current solicitations be invited
to participate in the specification conversion process? If yes, in what areas and to what
extent?
Subsidiary Question 3 : What is the affect on schedules and cost to accomplish this
conversion process?
Interview Questions
1. What is the anticipated time line to accomplish the review?
a. Identify military specifications and standards
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b. Determination if specification/standard is needed
c. Determine if a commercial specification or standard is available
d. Determine if feasible to convert to performance language
e. Prepare "what to do" instead of"how to" specification
f. Process waivers to use military specification or standard
2. What are the estimated personnel hours and costs to accomplish the review?
a. At the specification review activity level
1. Identify military specifications and standards
2. Determination if specification/standard is needed
3. Determine if a commercial specification/standard is available
4. Determine if feasible to convert to performance language
5. Prepare "what to do" instead of"how to" specification
6. Process waivers to use military specification/standard
b. At coordinating/approval levels
1
.
Determination if specification/standard is needed
2. Determine if a commercial specification/standard is available
3. Determine if feasible to convert to performance language
4. Prepare "what to do" instead of"how to" specification
5. Process waivers to use military specification/standard
3. What program delays, if any, have been experienced to date due to the review
process? What were the cause and length of any experienced delays?
4. What costs have been experienced at this date? What is the estimated cost to
complete the review?
5. Will changes to current contracts be considered? If so, what costs or savings can
be expected? What schedule improvements or delays can be expected?
6. How will savings be determined?
7. How will risk to schedules, costs, quality, and delivery be measured?
8. Are there possible delays to solicitation release, source selection, or award due to
the specification review process? If so, what slippage should be anticipated?
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Subsidiary Question 4 : What are the potential affects of the conversion process on
EPA approvals and certification requirements?
Interview Questions
1. Will EPA be involved in the specification review process? If so how, at what
level (Federal, State, local) and in what capacity at each level?
2. Is it anticipated that additional testing will be required due to specification
conversions?
3. Is there a potential that conversion to commercial or performance specifications
will increase risks in liability to the contractor? To the Government? To the facility
commander?
If so, what is the liability. Is the risk quantifiable and, if so, how will it be measured?
4. Will conversions to performance specifications compromise the Government's
ability to meet mandated requirements? If so, how?
5. Will use ofperformance specifications limit or transfer any legal responsibilities
under environmental laws from the installation commander or other Government
representatives to the contractor? If so, what will be transferred?
Subsidiary Question 5 : To what extent will contract type for the CSDP be affected by
predominant use of performance specifications? What measurement technique could
be used to evaluate contractor performance?
Interview Questions
1. Is there a coordination process anticipated to evaluate specification conversion
impact on contemplated contract type? If so, what is it?
2. What criteria and measures are currently used to evaluate contractor
performance?
3. How will contractor performance evaluation criteria be affected by specification
conversion? Can you provide examples?




THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. DC 20301
i c oct m
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
SUBJECT: Environmental Management Policy
This Administration wants the United States to be the worldleader in addressing environmental problemi and I want the
Department of Defense to be the Federal leader in agency
environmental compliance and protection.
Federal facilities, including military bases, must meet
environmental standards. Congress has repeatedly expressed a
similar sentiment. As the largeit Federal agency, the Department
of Defense has a great responsibility to meet this challenge, it
must be a command priority at all levels. We must demonstrate
commitment with accountability for responding to the Nation 1 s
environmental agenda. I want every command to be an
environmental standard by which Federal agencies are judged.
The first priority of our environmental policy must be to
integrate and budget environmental considerations into our
activities and operations. This will decrease our future
liabilities and costs for our people. The effort begins and ends
with our people. We need the right people at the right place
with the right training.
It is also extremely important that we communicate clearly
what we are doing to address our environmental concerns. We need
to work harder at telling our environmental success stories and
solving our problems in an open, cooperative way with the public
and also appropriate regulatory authorities. The universal
recognition of effective DoD environmental compliance and
stewardship activities is the surest way to maintain our access
to the air, land, and water we need to maintain and improve our
mission capability.
We must be fully committed to do our part to meet the
worldwide environmental challenge and I know I can count on your
support to ensure that we are successful in that effort.
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APPENDIX D
lHt SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON. DC 20)01
&& JUH ]toi
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS m
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMPTROLLER




DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONALTEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. U-S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
SUBJECT: Specifications & Standards - A New Way of Doing Business
To meet future needs, the Department of Defense must increase access to commercial
state-of-the-art technology and must facilitate the adoption by its suppliers of business
processes characteristic of world dass suppliers. In addition, integration of commercial and
military development and manufacturing facilitates the development of dual-use processes and
products and contributes to an expanded industrial base that is capable of meeting defense
needs at lower costs.
I have repeatedly stated that moving to greater use of performance and commercial
specifications and standards is one of the most important actions that DoD must take to
ensure we are able to meet our military, economic, and policy objectives in the future.
Moreover, the Vice President's National Performance Review recommends that agencies avoid
government-unique requirements and rely more on the commercial marketplace.
To accomplish this objective, the Deputy Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition
Reform) chartered a Process Action Team to develop a strategy and a specific plan of action
to decrease reliance, to the maximum extent practicable, on military specifications and
standards. The Process Action Team report 'Blueprint for Change." identifies the tasks
necessary to achieve this objective. I wholeheartedly accept the Team's report and approve
the report's primary recommendation to use performance and commercial specifications and
.standards in lieu of military specifications and standards, unless no practical alternative exists
to meet the user's needs. I also accept the report of the industry Review Panel on
Specifications and Standards and oVect the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) to appropriately implement the Panel's recommendations.
I direct the addressees to;take rmmecfiate action to implement the Team's
recommendations and assign the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)
.
overall implementation responsibility. I cfirect the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) to immediately arrange for reprogramming the funds needed in FY94 and FY95 to
efficiently implement the recommendations. I direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments
and the Directors of the Defense Agencies to program funding for FY96 and beyond in
accordance with the Defense ."Manning Guidance.
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Policy ChBPQCg
Listed below are a number of the most criticaJ changes to current policy that are
needed to implement the Process Action Team's recommendations. These changes are
effective immediately. However, it is not my intent to disrupt on-going solicitations or contract
negotiations. Therefore, the Component Acquisition Executive (as defined in Part 15 of DoD
Instruction 50002), or a designee, may waive the implementation of these changes for on-
going solicitations or contracts during the next 180 days following the date of this
memorandum. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)-shall implement
these policy changes in DoD Instruction 5000.2, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS), and any other instructions, manuals, regulations, or policy documents,
as appropriate.
Military Specifications and Standards: Performance specifications snail be used when
purchasing new systems, major modifications, upgrades to current systems, and
nondevelopmental and commercial items, for programs in any acquisition category. If it is not
practicable to use a performance specification, a non-government standard shall be used.
Since there win be cases when military specifications are needed to define an exact design
solution because there is no acceptable non-governmental standard or because the use of a
performance specification or non-government standard is not cost effective, the use of military
specifications and standards is authorized as a last resort with an appropriate waiver.
Waivers for the use of military specifications and standards must be approved by the
Milestone Decision Authority (as defined in Part 2 of DoD Instruction 50002). In the case of
acquisition category I D programs , waivers may be granted by the Component Acquisition
Executive, or a designee. The Director, Naval Nudear Propulsion shall determine the
specifications and standards to be used for naval nuclear propulsion plants in' accordance with
Pub. L 98-525 (42 U.S.C. §7158 note). Waivers for reprocurement of Hems already in the
inventory are not required. Waivers may be made on a "class" or item basis for a period of
time not to exceed two years.
Innovative Contract Management: The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) shall develop, within 60 days of the dale of this memorandum. Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) language to encourage contractors to propose
non-government standards and industry-wide practices that meet the intent of the military
specifications and standards. The Under Secretary will make thjs language effective 180 days
after the date of this memorandum. This language win be developed for inclusion in both
requests for proposal and in on-going contracts. These standards and practices shall be
considered as alternatives to those military specifications and standards cited in all new
contracts expected to have a value of $100,000 or more, and in existing contracts of $500,000
or more having a substantial contract effort remaining to be performed.
Pending completion of the language, I encourage the Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies to exercise their existing authority to
use solicitation and contract clause language such as the language proposed in the Process
Action Team's report. Government contracting officers shall expedite the processing of
proposed alternatives to military specifications and standards and are encouraged to use the
Value Engineering no-cost-settlement method (permitted by FAR 48.104-3) in existing
contracts.
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Program Use of Specifications and Standards: Use of specifications and standards listed in
DoD Instruction 5000.2 is not mandatory for Program Managers. These specifications and
standards are tools available to the Program Manager, who shall view them as guidance as
stated in Section 6-Q of DoD Instruction 5000.2.
Tiering of Specifications and Standards: During production, those system specifications,
subsystem specifications and equipment/product specifications (through and including the first-
tier references in the equtpment/jproduct specifications) cited in the contract shall be mandatory
for use. Lower tier references will be for guidance only, and will not be contractually binding
unless they are directly cited in the contract Specifications and standards listed on
engineering drawings are to be considered as first-tier references. Approval of exceptions to
this policy may only be made by the Head of the Departmental or Agency Standards
improvement Office and the Director. Naval Nudear Propulsion for specifications and drawings
used in nuclear propulsion plants in accordance with Pub. L 98-525 (42 U.S.C. §7158 Note).
"
New Directions
Management and Manufacturing Specifications and Standards: Program Managers shall
use management and manufacturing specifications and standards for guidance only. The
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) shall develop a plan for canceling
these specifications and standards, inactivating them for new designs, transferring the
specifications and standards to non-govemmerrt'standards, converting them to performance-
based specifications, or justifying their retention as military specifications and standards. The
plan shaJI begin with the ten management and manufacturing standards identified in the
Report of the Industry Review Panel on Specifications and Standards and shall require
completion of the appropriate action, to the' maximum extent practicable, within two years.
Configuration Control: To the extent practicable, the Government should maintain
configuration control of the functional and performance requirements only, giving contractors
responsibility for the detailed design.
Obsolete-Specifications: The "Department of Defense Index of Specifications and
Standards" and the "Acquisition Management System and Data Requirements Control List-
contain outdated military specifications and standards and data requirements that should not
be used for new development efforts. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology) shall develop a procedure for identifying and removing these obsolete
requirements.
Use of Non-Government Standards: I encourage the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology) to form partnerships with industry associations to develop non-
government standards for replacement of military standards where practicable. The Under
Secretary shall adopt and list in the "Department of Defense Index of Specifications and
Standards" (DODISS) non-government standards currently being used by DoD. The Under
Secretary shall also establish teams to review the federal supply classes and standardization .
areas to identify candidates for conversion or replacement.
Reducing Oversight: I direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of
the Defense Agencies to reduce direct Government oversight by substituting process controls
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and non-government standards in place of development and/or production testing and
inspection and military-unique quality assurance systems.
Cultural Changes
Challenge Acquisition Requirements: Program Managers and acquisition decisionmakers at
all levels shall challenge requirements because the problem of unique military systems does
not begin with the standards. The problem is rooted In the requirements determination phase
of the acquisition cycle.
Enhance Pollution Controls: The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors
of the Defense Agencies shall establish and execute an aggressive program to identify and
reduce or eliminate toxic pollutants procured or generated through the use of specifications
and standards.
Education and Training: The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) shaJt
ensure that training and education programs throughout the Department are revised to
incorporate specifications and standards reform.
Program Reviews: Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) review of programs at all levels shaJI
include consideration of the extent streamlining, both in the contract and in the oversight
process, is being pursued. The MDA (i.e., the Component Acquisition Executive or his/her
designee, for all but ACAT 1 D programs) will be responsible for ensuring that progress is being
made with respect to programs under his/her cognizance.
Standards Improvement Executives: The Under Secretary, the Secretaries of the Military
Departments, and the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency shall appoint Standards
Improvement Executives within 30 days. The Standards Improvement Executives shall
assume the responsibilities of the current Standardization Executives, support those carrying
out acquisition reform, direct implementation of the military specifications and standards reform
prograrrrrand participate on the Defense Standards Improvement Council. The Defense
Standards Improvement Council shall be the primary coordinating body for the specification
and standards program within the Department of Defense and shall report directly to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security). The Council shall coordinate with the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition'Reform) regarding specification and
standards reform matters, and shall provide periodic progress reports to the Acquisition
Reform Senior Steering Group, who will monitor overall implementation progress.
Management Commitment
This Process Action Team tackled one of the most difficult issues we will face in
reforming the acquisition process. I would like to commend the team, composed of
representatives from all of the Military Departments and appropriate Defense Agencies, and its
leader, Mr. Darold Griffin, for a job well done. In addition, I would like to thank the Army, and in
particular, Army Materiel Command, for its administrative support of the team.
.
The Process Action Team's report and the policies contained in this memorandum are
not a total solution to the problems inherent in the use of military specifications and standards;
however, they are a solid beginning that will increase the use of performance and commercial
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specifications and standards. Your leadership and good judgment willbe critical to successful
Implementation ot this reform.
I encourage you and your leadership teams to be active
participants in establishing the environment essential for implementing this cultural change.
This memorandum is intended only to improve the internal management of the
Department of Defense and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY)
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND,
CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)
GENERAL COUNSEL
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS OF DEFENSE AGENCIES
STJSJECT: CoTnmon Systems /ISO- 9 000 /Expedited Block. Changes
My June 29, 1994 memorandum on Specifications and
Standards directed the use of performance specifications to
the maximum extent practicable, and the development of a
streamlined procurement process to modify existing contracts
to enco-cra.g& contractors tc propose non-government
specifications and industry-wide practices that meet the
intent of military specifications and standards which impose
government -unique management and manufacturing requirements .
Although much progress is being made in applying these
principles on new contracts, this progress has itself shown
that government -unique requirements en existing contracts
prevent xis from realizing the full benefits ox these changes
by requiring, in a single facility, multiple management and
manufacturing systems designed to accomplish the same purpose.
Because it is generally not efficient to operate multiple,
government -unique management and manufacturing systems within
a given facility, there is en urgent need to shift Co
facility-wide common, systems on existing contracts as well.
In order to meet cur military, economic and policy
objectives in the future, and to expedite the transition to
this new way of doing business, the direction given in my June
29, 199 4, memorandum is hereby revised. In addition to the
direction given there for- government—unique specifications and
standards, I now direct that block changes to the taanagement
and manufacturing requirements of existing contracts be made
on a facility-wide basis, tc unify management and
manufacturing requirements within a facility, wherever such
changes are technically acceptable to the government. The
single point of contact for this effort will be the





The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology shall issue additional guidance necessary to
facilitate the Department's streamlined review of concr-actor's
proposals to replace government-unique management and
manufacturing requirements in existing contracts with uniform
requirements within the contractor's facilities.
We cannot afford to allow "business as usual" to delay
this initiative. I therefore request that you and your
leadership take an active role in expediting the transition of
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